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The ICC's Jurisdiction over War Crimes in
Internal Armed Conflicts: An
Insurmountable Obstacle for China's
Accession?
Jing Guan*
I. INTRODUCTION
More than a decade has passed since the 1998 adoption of the Rome
Statute establishing the International Criminal Court ("ICC").1 Today,
the ICC has developed into a fully functioning institution. By June 1,
2010, the ICC will enjoy as many as 111 states parties, with Bangladesh
ratifying the Rome Statute most recently on March 23, 2010.2 Four
situations are currently under court proceedings: three self-referrals by
states parties (Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Central
African Republic) and one by the United Nations ("UN") Security
Council on a non-party state (Darfur, Sudan).3 Most recently on March
31, 2010, a majority of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II granted the
Prosecutor's request to commence an investigation on crimes against
* Doctoral Candidate and O'Brien Fellow, Faculty of Law and Centre for Human
Rights and Legal Pluralism, McGill University, Canada; LL.M. 2009 and Victor and
William Fung Fellow, Harvard Law School, United States; LL.M. 2008 and LL.B. 2005,
School of Law, Xiamen University, China. The author can be contacted via email at
jingguan6l7@gmail.com. I wish to thank Professor William P. Alford, Professor Ryan
Goodman, Professor Ren& Provost, Professor John Ball, and all the fellow classmates of
the 2009 International Law Workshop at Harvard for their valuable comments on
previous drafts.
1. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M.
1002 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. See Press Release, International Criminal Court, Bangladesh ratifies the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/bangladesh%20ratifies%20t
he%20rome%20statute%20ofo20the%20international%20criminal%20court (last visited
April 23, 2010).
3. See Situations and Cases, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+
Cases/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
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humanity allegedly committed in Kenya's 2007 post-election violence.4
This decision marks the first use of the Prosecutorial proprio motu power
in a case before the ICC.
5
Against such broad membership and robust development of the
ICC, however, China, and some other major states such as the United
States, Russia, and India are still outside of the ICC family. 6 As one of
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5) and a
rising power playing increasingly greater role in international affairs, it is
impossible and perhaps unwise for China to remain permanently
detached from the development of the ICC. The first Review Conference
for the Rome Statute is scheduled for May 31 and June 11, 2010, in
Kampala, Uganda.7 Now is an opportune time for China to reassess its
reservations towards the Rome Statute and consider what stance it wishes
to take and what proposals it may wish to put forward as an observer at
the first Review Conference. If achieving universality remains one of the
main goals of the Rome Statute, it is also important for current states
parties to the ICC to reexamine how major non-party states, such as
China, could be attracted to join the ICC at the first Review Conference.
Due to its historically conditioned concern for maintenance of
sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Chinese government stated five
main reasons for voting against the Rome Statute after the 1998 Rome
Conference. 8 First, China is unable to accept the broad jurisdiction of
the ICC as prescribed by the Rome Statute. It is not based on states'
voluntary acceptance, 9 but rather, imposes obligations on non-party
states without their consent.10 Such jurisdiction violates the principle of
state sovereignty and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties."l
Second, China holds serious reservations about the ICC's jurisdiction
4. See Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC judges grant the
Prosecutor's request to launch an investigation on crimes against humanity with regard to
the situation in Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
exeres/D81AA5AF-CD76-4B3C-A4FC-AA7819569B44.htm.
5. See id.
6. At the Rome Conference, both China and the United States voted against the
Rome Statute despite their active involvement in the negotiations that led to its adoption.
While India abstained and Russia actually signed the Rome Statute, the prospect of these
four states joining the ICC any time soon remains doubtful.
7. See Review Conference of the Rome Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/asp/
reviewconference/review%20conference?lan=en-GB (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
8. See Guangya Wang on the Statute of the International Criminal Court, LEGAL
DAILY, July 29, 1998 (in Chinese), at 4 [hereinafter Guangya Wang].
9. According to Article 12(1) of the Rome Statute, acceptance of the ICC's
jurisdiction is compulsory upon states' ratification.
10. See Guangya Wang, supra note 8.
11. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1968, 1115 U.N.T.S.
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over war crimes committed in internal armed conflicts. 12 In China's
view, these crimes should be and are better handled by capable national
courts, and the present definition of war crimes under the Rome Statute
goes beyond that of customary international law. 13 Third, China also has
serious reservations over the proprio motu power of the Prosecutor to
investigate, which, in China's view, amounts to the right to judge and
rule on state conduct. 14  Fourth, China contends that crimes against
humanity should be related to wartime, and many conducts listed under
the Rome Statute belong to human rights law rather than international
criminal law.1 5  Finally, China views the ICC's jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression weakens the power of the UN Security Council, who
should first act upon possible cases of aggression.16 Despite its negative
vote, China's current official stance remains that it has continuously
shown support in principle for the ICC, that it currently adopts an open
attitude as to accession, and actively observes the actual performance of
the ICC with a serious and responsible attitude.' 7  China has also
participated in the Assembly of States Parties ("ASP") as an observer
since 2002.18
What should be revealed are China's real concerns behind its
official reasons for not joining the ICC. Whereas the United States is
mostly concerned about the ICC's possible reach to its enormous number
of troops deployed in various war-torn areas around the world,' 9 and
Russia and India are mostly concerned about the ICC's possible
intervention into the Chechnya and Kashmir conflicts, 20 the Taiwan issue
is the most fatal potential conflict between China and the ICC.2' The
ICC's jurisdiction over war crimes in internal armed conflicts could
12. See Guangya Wang, supra note 8.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See China and the International Criminal Court, Oct. 28, 2003,
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/tyfl/2626/2627/t15473.htm (last visited Apr. 13,
2010). China reiterated similar views both in 2005 and 2008. See Position Paper of the
People's Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms, June 7, 2005, available at
http://www.finprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/tl 99318.htm.
18. See ICC Archive, http://www.amicc.org/icc-archive.html (last visited Apr. 13,
2010).
19. See Michael P. Scharf, Results of the Rome Conference for an International
Criminal Court, Aug. 1998, available at http://www.asil.org/insigh23.cfm.
20. See Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, In the Transatlantic Gap, Russ. IN GLOBAL
AFF., No. 4, (Oct.-Dec. 2004), available at http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/9/
71 0.html; see also India non-aligned, but held back by insurgencies, INT'L JUST. TRIB.,
Apr. 16, 2007, http://www.rnw.nllinternational-justice/article/india-non-aligned-held-
back-insurgencies (last visited May 4, 2010).
21. See infra Part VII.
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result in interference with China's internal affairs. To a lesser extent,
Tibet, Xinjiang, Falun Gong and deficiencies in its national judicial
system are other concerns for China vis-A-vis the ICC.
22
Hence, this article focuses on the examination of the ICC's
jurisdiction over war crimes in internal armed conflicts and discusses
whether such jurisdiction amounts to an insurmountable obstacle for
China's accession to the ICC in light of its real concerns.2 3 In order to
make the picture complete, this article also briefly analyses China's other
four major official reasons for not joining the ICC, 24 and summarizes
positive reasons for China to join the ICC.25 In concluding that although
understandable concerns do exist, no real legal obstacles stand in the way
for China's accession to the ICC,2 6 this article finally attempts to explain
what is really at stake for China's reluctance to join the ICC at this
stage.27
II. THE BATTLE OVER WAR CRIMES AT THE ROME CONFERENCE
At the 1998 Rome Conference, under the strong insistence of the
United States and the powerful "Like-Minded Group, 28 provisions on
war crimes in internal armed conflicts were included in the Rome
Statute.29 Such inclusion was one of the most controversial issues during
the negotiations. 30  The United States emphasized that extending the
ICC's jurisdiction from international armed conflicts to internal armed
conflicts was extremely important, because nowadays internal armed
conflicts are the most frequent and most cruel. 31 Other states concurred
that such inclusion went to the very relevance of the ICC, 32 to the "raison
22. See infra Part VIII.
23. See infra Parts II-VII.
24. See infra Part VIII.
25. See infra Part IX.
26. See id.
27. See infra Part X.
28. Composed of over 60 middle powers and developing countries, promoted the
establishment of the ICC and generally favored a strong and independent court. See
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE (Vol. 1) 3
(Shiguang Li, Daqun Liu & Yan Ling eds., Beijing Univ. Press, 2006) (in Chinese)
[hereinafter Shiguang Li]; see also Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome
Conference on an ICC: the Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2, 4 (1999).
29. See Rome Statute, supra note 1.
30. See Thomas Graditzky, War Crime Issues before the Rome Diplomatic
Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 5 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 199, 208 (1999).
31. See UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.5 (US), 61; UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.I/SR.6,
100 (US).
32. UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.l/SR.4, 72 (Denmark); UN Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4, 74 (Sweden); UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.t/SR.26, 123
(Greece).
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d'&re,' ' 33 to "credibility," 34 and to the "integrity and rationale" 35 of the
ICC.
A not negligible minority of states, mostly members of the Arab
League and the Non-Aligned Movement, including Algeria, Azerbaijan,
Burundi, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Mexico, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian
Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam, objected to such
inclusion. 36  These states believed that the provisions did not reflect
customary international law, 37 would lead to interferences in the
domestic affairs of states, and would result in difficulties in drawing a
line between a genuine internal armed conflict and internal
disturbances.38 Some of these states only supported a provision based on
Article 3 common to the 1949 four Geneva Conventions for the
Protection of War Victims (common Article 3), but not one based on the
1977 Additional Protocol II to the four Geneva Conventions (Additional
Protocol 11).
39
During the 1998 Rome Conference, China expressed serious
reservations over such inclusion.40  China argued that the current
definition of war crimes under the Rome Statute goes beyond that of
customary international law. 4 1 This argument is two-fold. First, internal
armed conflicts are not within the scope of war crimes under existing
customary international law, which only covers international armed
conflicts.42 States with robust legal systems are capable of prosecuting
war related offenses committed in internal armed conflicts. Domestic
courts have apparent advantages over the ICC in prosecuting these types
of crimes.43 Second, the current definition of war crimes under the
Rome Statute goes even beyond that of Additional Protocol II.
44
Therefore, China maintained that states should be allowed to opt in or
33. UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, 54 (Republic of Korea).
34. UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, 72 (Togo).
35. UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, 97 (United States).
36. See Anthony Cullen, The Definition of Non-International Armed Conflict in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: An Analysis of the Threshold of
Application Contained in Article 8(2)69, 12 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 419, n. 28 (2007);
LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 165 (2002).
37. See UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, 102 (Iran); UN Doc.
A/CONF. 183/C.1/SR.25, 36 (China).
38. See UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27, 5 (Algeria).
39. See UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4, 76 (Sudan); UN Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25, 59 (Azerbaijan); UN Doe. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25, 65
(Mexico).
40. See Guangya Wang, supra note 8.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
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out of the ICC's jurisdiction over these types of crimes.4 5  Presently,
although the Rome Statute makes temporal arrangement for the
acceptance of the ICC's jurisdiction over war crimes (i.e., the seven-year
opt-out mechanism), it rejects the "opt in or out" method in principle.46
This will result in many states backing away from the ICC.
4 7
In response to China's arguments, I shall begin my discussion with
the blurring of the conventional dichotomy between international and
internal armed conflicts48 and the possible implications of extending war
crimes to internal armed conflicts. 49 My main contention is that even
though the customary international law status of such extension is still
not free from debate, it appears farfetched and no longer plausible for
China to oppose such a compelling trend. In fact, China's position seems
less rigid than denying the criminality of war related offenses in internal
armed conflicts. Rather, China appears more concerned about the
compulsory complementary jurisdiction of the ICC over war crimes.5°
While granting the ICC with compulsory complementary jurisdiction is
with sound reasons, time is still needed for China to accept such
"intrusive" jurisdiction. I then examine the specific war crimes
provisions under the Rome Statute that exceed customary international
law5' and analyze them in light of China's real concerns behind its
official reasons for war crimes, i.e., the Taiwan issue, and to a lesser
degree, possible recurrences of separatist/terrorist violence in the Tibet
and Xinjiang provinces.52 My conclusion is that these provisions do not
pose real difficulty for China.
III. THE BLURRING OF THE CONVENTIONAL DICHOTOMY BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS
Traditional international law held that war crimes may only be
committed during wars proper, i.e., international armed conflicts
involving two or more sovereign states, and as an exception, civil wars
that are treated as international armed conflicts due to recognition of
belligerency. Violations of international law committed in internal
45. See Guangya Wang, supra note 8.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See infra Part III.
49. See infra Part IV.
50. See infra Part V.
51. See infra Part VI.
52. See infra Part VII.
53. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995), 96 [hereinafter Tadic Defence
Motion].
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armed conflicts were not criminalized.54 In 1993, when commenting on
the proposed draft statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), the International Committee of the Red
Cross ("ICRC") underlined the fact that "according to international
humanitarian law as it [stood then], the notion of war crimes [was]
limited to situations of international armed conflict., 55 The Commission
of Experts appointed to investigate violations of humanitarian law in the
former Yugoslavia reached similar conclusions in its final report:
The treaty-based law applicable to internal armed conflicts is
relatively recent and is contained in [common Article 3], Additional
Protocol II, and article 19 of the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural
Property. It is unlikely that there is any body of customary
international law applicable to internal armed conflict which does not
find its root in these treaty provisions. It is probable that [common
Article 3] would be viewed as a statement of customary international
law, but unlikely that the other instruments would be so viewed. In
particular, there does not appear to be a customary international law
applicable to internal armed conflicts which includes the concept of
war crimes. 56
Two years later, in commenting on the subject matter jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), the 1995 UN
Secretary-General report viewed that the UN Security Council took a
more expansive approach to the choice of the applicable law than the one
underlying the ICTY Statute, and included within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the ICTR international instruments "regardless of whether
they were considered part of customary international law or whether they
have customarily entailed the individual criminal responsibility of the
perpetrator of the crime. 57 The report stated that the ICTR Statute "for
the first time criminalize[d] [common Article 3],, 58 while "the question
of whether [common Article 3] entails the individual responsibility of the
perpetrator of the crime is still debatable,, 59 and viewed that "violations
54. Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International
Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 551, 572 (2006) [hereinafter, Meron, War Crimes].
55. Some Preliminary Remarks by the International Committee of the Red Cross on
the Setting up of an International Tribunal (Feb. 22, 1993) (reprinted in VIRGINIA MoRRIS
& MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 391, 392 (1995)).
56. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780 (1992), UN Doc. S/1994/674, Annex, 52.
57. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council
Resolution 955 (1994), UN Doc. S/1995/134, 1 12 (Feb. 13, 1995), available at
http://www.ictrcaselaw.org/docs/N9504302.pdf.
58. Id.
59. Id. at n.8.
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of Additional Protocol II, which, as a whole, has not yet been universally
recognized as part of customary international law.",
60
Eight months later, the seminal judgment of the ICTY Appeals
Chamber in its Tadic case brought about even more significant
innovations.61  The Appeals Chamber directly challenged the
conventional dichotomy between international and internal armed
conflicts and paved the road to the extension of the concept of war
crimes to internal armed conflicts under the Rome Statute. 62  It
concluded that war crimes could be committed not only in international
armed conflicts but also in internal armed conflicts. 63 It claimed that
"customary international law imposes criminal liability for serious
violations of common Article 3," 64 and that the core of Additional
Protocol II can now be regarded as having reached the status of
customary international law. 65  Therefore, the Appeals Chamber
concluded that under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute (titled "violations of
the laws or customs of war"), it had jurisdiction over the acts alleged in
the indictment, "regardless of whether they occurred within an internal or
an international armed conflict.
66
In its detailed reasoning, the Appeals Chamber first opined that the
dichotomy between international and internal armed conflicts was
"clearly sovereignty-oriented and reflected the traditional configuration
of the international community, based on the coexistence of sovereign
States more inclined to look after their own interests than community
concerns or humanitarian demands., 67 The reason that "interstate wars
were regulated by a whole body of international legal rules" but that
"very few international rules govern[ed] civil commotion" was because
"[s]tates preferred to regard internal strife as rebellion, mutiny and
treason coming within the purview of national criminal law and, by the
same token, to exclude any possible intrusion by other States into their
own domestic jurisdiction., 68 The Appeals Chamber then eloquently
stated the following:
Since the 1930s .... [this] distinction has gradually become more and
more blurred .... There exist various reasons for this development.
First, civil wars have become more frequent.... Secondly, internal
60. Id. at T 12.
61. See Tadic Defence Motion, supra note 53.
62. Id. at 991 97-137.
63. Id. at 137.
64. Id. at T 134.
65. Id. 117.
66. See Tadic Defence Motion, supra note 53, at 137.
67. Id. at T 96.
68. Id.
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armed conflicts have become more and more cruel and protracted....
Thirdly, the large-scale nature of civil strife, coupled with the
increasing interdependence of States in the world community, has
made it more and more difficult for third States to remain aloof...
Fourthly, the impetuous development and propagation in the
international community of human rights doctrines. . . has brought
about significant changes in international law. . . . If international
law, while of course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of
States, must gradually turn to the protection of human beings, it is
only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy should gradually lose
its weight.
69
Indeed, logically speaking and from the lex ferenda7 ° perspective,
the same war related offenses committed in any armed conflict should
not be treated differently. Armed conflicts, whether international or
internal, are all bloody wars involving unfortunate human sufferings. It
seems axiomatic that heinous war related offenses committed in any
armed conflict, whether international or internal, must not escape
punishment. Under such conclusion, it would be very difficult to
reasonably explain why the same offenses amount to "the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole" when
committed in the context of international armed conflicts, but not when
committed in the context of internal armed conflicts. 71 As compellingly
posed by the rhetorical question of the Appeals Chamber:
Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture
or the wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private
property, as well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering
when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain from
enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when armed
violence has erupted "only" within the territory of a sovereign
State?72
Hence, "[t]here is no moral justification, and no truly persuasive legal
reason, for treating perpetrators of atrocities in internal conflicts more
leniently than those engaged in international wars."
7 3
Nevertheless, from the lex lata perspective, the innovative
conclusion of the Tadic decision was too advanced back in 1995. 74 As
69. Id. at 97.
70. Lexferenda also known as de legeferenda, is "[a] proposed principle that might
be applied to a given situation instead or in the absence of a legal principle that is in
force." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 459 (8th ed. 2004).
71. See Tadic Defence Motion, supra note 53, at 97.
72. Id.
73. Meron, War Crimes, supra note 54, at 573.
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Judge Haopei Li (China) pointed out in his separate opinion to the Tadic
decision, the decision failed to prove the two required elements of
customary international law.75  Indeed, the Appeals Chamber only
enumerated a surprisingly small amount of state practice before
concluding that "customary international law imposes criminal liability
for serious violations of common Article 3. ' 76 Judge Li also referred to
the internal armed conflict of Rwanda, asking why, if violations of the
laws or customs of war enumerated in Article 3 of the ICTY Statute
could be committed in either type of conflict as the result of the
development of customary international law, they were not included in
the ICTR Statute (Article 4 of the ICTR Statute only referred to
violations of common Article 3 and Additional Protocol I1).77 Theodor
Meron similarly concluded that "[t]his omission reflects the accepted
wisdom, which unfortunately denies war crimes a place in internal
conflicts. ' ' 78 Hence the ICTY Appeals Chamber has been accused of
exercising unwarranted legislative power when the relevant customary
international law was still ambiguous.79
Similarly, it is still not free from debate whether customary
international law, at the adoption of the 1998 Rome Statute or as it stands
now, extended the concept of war crimes to internal armed conflicts.
Arguably, the fact that a not negligible minority of states opposed such
an extension at the Rome Conference and have not yet changed their
position, serves the best evidence. 8  Wenqi Zhu, former ICTY
Prosecutor in the Appellate Section from China, opined that from a pure
academic perspective, there was no clear delimitation concerning this
issue when the Rome Statute was adopted in 1998.81 Zhu reasoned that
the consensus before the adoption of the Rome Statute was that even if
common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II prohibited some conduct
74. Lex lata, also known as de lege lata is "the principle that a court should decide
based on actual law and not on how it thinks that law ought to be." BLACK'S, supra note
70. at 459.
75. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Separate Opinion of Judge Li on the
Defence of Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, T 11 (Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadic
Judge Li].
76. Tadic Defence Motion, supra note 53, 134.
77. Tadic Judge Li, supra note 75, 11.
78. Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 554, 574 (1995).
79. See Tadic Judge Li, supra note 75, 13; WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 115 (3d ed. 2007); George H.
Aldrich, The Laws of War on Land, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 42, 61 (2000).
80. See supra Part II.
81. Wenqi Zhu, Whether China Should Join the International Criminal Court
(Upper), HUBEI SOCIAL SCIENCES (in Chinese), No. 10, 141, 145 (2007) [hereinafter Zhu,
Whether China Should Join (Upper)].
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during internal armed conflicts, such conduct did not necessarily lead to
war crimes entailing individual criminal responsibility. 82 Hence, Zhu
concluded that the Rome Statute negated the traditional practice of
leaving internal armed conflicts at the hand of domestic courts.83 While
Antonio Cassese opined in 2003 that "particularly after the [Tadic case],
it is now widely accepted that serious infringements of customary or
applicable treaty law on internal armed conflicts must also be regarded as
amounting to war crimes proper,' 84 cautious Chinese scholars, in the
same year, asserted that the international society has not yet come to an
agreement as to whether the laws or customs of war apply to non-
international as well as international armed conflicts. 85 Again, while Eve
La Haye attempted to show that by January 1, 2007, the extension of the
concept of war crimes to internal armed conflicts had already acquired a
place under customary international law by enumerating a variety of
evidences of practice and opinion juris of states and international
organizations,86 the most conservative Chinese scholars held in the same
year that under customary international law as it stands now, the concept
of war crimes still only applies to international armed conflicts.87 These
scholars argued that although ad hoc international tribunals have made
certain breakthroughs in individual cases by applying the concept of war
crimes to internal armed conflicts, such as the Tadic case, these cases
lacked the necessary universality to break through customary
international law.88 Therefore, these scholars contended that conducts
specified in common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II should remain
under the jurisdiction of domestic courts.89
Admittedly, therefore, there is still room for China and other
dissenting states to contest the customary status of the extension of the
concept of war crimes to internal armed conflicts. Dissenting states
82. Id.
83. Wenqi Zhu, The Prospect of China's Joining in the International Criminal
Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CHOICE OF CHINA (in Chinese) 154, 159
(Mingxuan Gao et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Zhu, Prospect of China's Joining].
84. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 47 (Oxford Press 2003).
85. See, e.g., Shigui Tan, A Preliminary Study of the Relations between China and
the ICC, in STUDY ON MAJOR ISSUES RELATING TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
(in Chinese) 65 (Bingzhi Zhao ed., 2003).
86. January 1, 2007 is the end date of her data. See EVA LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN
INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 148-71 (Cambridge University Books 2008).
87. Mingxuan Gao & Junping Wang, Issues of Concern to China regarding the
International Criminal Court, PEOPLE'S PROCURATORIAL SEMIMONTHLY (in Chinese),
No. 7, 5, 9 (2007).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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could argue that many specially affected states (though debatable), 90
such as China, India, and Russia, oppose such extension and thus remain
non-party states to the ICC. And even if such extension has secured a
customary status, dissenting states could still oppose it by resorting to the
principle of the "persistent objector," 9' despite the fact that this principle
itself has met various attacks. 92  This is the very reason why China
regrettably chose to cast a negative vote at the Rome Conference.
93
However, given the compelling rationale behind the extension of the
concept of war crimes to internal armed conflicts and the broad
recognition that this trend has already gained, the minority opposing
states would at least be situated in an uneasy position pressurized to
accept the new trend from their majority peer states that champion it.
Hence, it appears farfetched and no longer plausible for China to rigidly
insist on "respect for state sovereignty" and "non-interference with
internal affairs" to exclude minimum humanitarian requirements and
supervision by the international community over the most heinous crimes
committed in internal armed conflicts. Indeed, the fact that by now-
more than ten years after the adoption of the Rome Statute-more than
half of the world's states have ratified, and many of them have initiated
domestic legislations to implement the Rome Statute evidences that the
definitions of the international crimes under the Rome Statute have
gained or are gaining broad recognition. 94 This in itself is a clarification
and development of the relevant customary international law. 
95
90. The concept of "specially affected states" was developed by the ICJ in North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases. N. Sea Cont'l Shelf (F.R.G.-Neth.; F.R.G.-Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 42,
43 (Feb. 20). Jean-Marie Henckaerts argued that "[u]nlike the law of the sea, where a
state either has or does not have a coast, with respect to humanitarian law any state can
potentially become involved in armed conflict and become 'specially affected."' Jean-
Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Response to US
Comments, 89 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 473, 481(2007). While it is true that any state can
potentially become involved in (internal) armed conflict, the degree of imminent potential
differs among states. Arguably states confronting entrenched thorny domestic problems
that are susceptible to mass violence are more affected than those confronting less thorny
or mere potential ones.
91. The principle of the "persistent objector" was developed by the ICJ in the
Fisheries Case (U.K. v Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 131 (Dec. 18).
92. For an in-depth discussion of the existence and continued relevance of the
principle of the "persistent objector" despite attacks on it, see Maurice H. Mendelson,
The Formation of Customary International Law, in 272 RECuEIL DES COURS 227-244,
334 (1998).
93. See supra Part II.
94. Zhu, Whether China Should Join (Upper), supra note 81, at 145.
95. Id.
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IV. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDING WAR CRIMES TO
INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS
The above discussion reveals the obsession with proving or denying
the customary status of extending the concept of war crimes to internal
armed conflicts by the current literature. What is really at stake in this
debate are the possible implications of upgrading war related offenses
committed during internal armed conflicts to the category of war crimes
under customary international law. Indeed, the full panoply of such
implications can be quite daunting for any state.
To be specific, pushing the lex ferenda argument to its limit may,
depending on a state's acceptance, implicate war crimes status on:
(1) individual criminal responsibility under international law as opposed
to national, which would increase the gravity and seriousness of the
crime; (2) violations of jus cogens;96 and (3) entitlement to claims of
universal jurisdiction by third states, which may even trigger the
mandatory duty of autjudicare, aut dedere that is already applicable to
''grave breaches" of the four Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol I. 97 The implications ofjus cogens and/or universal jurisdiction
would further include prohibition against immunities for governmental
officials (at least substantive immunity if not procedural immunity as
well), statutes of limitations, and national amnesty laws. 98 This list, if
fully triggered, would indeed be very intrusive to the conventional
understanding of sovereignty and non-interference with internal affairs.
Arguably very few states would presently be willing and prepared to
accept the whole package.
The reality, however, remains that most of the abovementioned
implications are still under great debate, the least perhaps being the
criminality of war related offenses during internal armed conflicts. Even
the 2001 Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, aimed to promote
the very concept of universal jurisdiction and claimed to present
96. There is considerable support for the proposition that all states are entitled to
exercise universal jurisdiction over violations ofjus cogens norms, but this conclusion
and nearly all of the other alleged implications ofjus cogens have remained controversial.
For detailed discussion, see CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 142-44 (Cambridge 2005). Jus cogens is defined as "[a] rule or
principle in international law that is so fundamental that it binds all states and does not
allow any exceptions." OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LAW 309 (Jonathan Law &Elizabeth A.
Martin ed., Oxford University Press 2009) (1983).
97. Under extradition law, aut judicare, aut dedere is the "doctrine that offenders
must be either punished by the state of refuge or surrendered to the state that can and will
punish them." OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LAW, supra note 96, at 51.
98. See Tams, supra note 96, at 142-44.
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elements of both lex lata and lex ferenda,99 did not explicitly include
internal armed conflicts under its scope of war crimes that would trigger
universal jurisdiction. As aforementioned, Eve La Haye concluded after
a comprehensive survey that, as of 2007, customary international law
recognized war related offenses committed during internal armed
conflicts as war crimes.1 00 Based on a similar survey, however, she also
concluded that war crimes committed in internal armed conflict do not
yet entail the customary right of universal jurisdiction of all states, and
that the mandatory regime of autjudicare, aut dedere does not apply to
such internal crimes. 10'
Hence, it is still very much debatable whether giving war crimes
status to war related offenses committed in internal armed conflicts
amounts to automatically subjecting them to universal jurisdiction. In
this sense, a state's ratification of the Rome Statute would not
automatically or necessarily be tantamount to agreeing to any alleged
universal jurisdiction over such crimes. At the same time, realistically
speaking, states rarely invoke pure universal jurisdiction over nationals
of other states (i.e. the crime, victim and defendant in question having no
relation at all with the prosecuting state).10 2 This is due to concerns of
reciprocity and mutual self-interest, lack of national interests, difficulties
in apprehending the defendant and gathering evidence, and other
practical or political concerns. 10 3  Belgium's amendment of its 1993
legislation on universal jurisdiction and, thus, retreat from the notion of
pure universal jurisdiction (though at the dismay of human rights
activists) serves as the prime example. i04 Nevertheless, the possibility of
future normative development towards this direction cannot be
precluded. Hence, should China (or any other non-party states) have any
concems over these issues when it decides to join the ICC, it may wish to
clarify its position towards these issues in order to avoid any undesired
inferences by the ICC or any other states.
99. See PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 37 (2001).
100. See HAYE, supra note 86, at 385.
101. See id.
102. See Stephen A Oxman, The Quest for Clarity in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:
NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 65 (Stephen Macedo ed., University of Pennsylvania Press 2006) ("That there have
been fewer pure cases than one might expect is perhaps not surprising because nations
and their courts seem predisposed, for understandable reasons, to avoid the less familiar,
scary water of universal jurisdiction .. ")
103. See Gabriel Bottini, Universal Jurisdiction after the Creation of the
International Criminal Court, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 503, 550-557 (2004).
104. See Sharon Sadeh, Belgium amends war crime legislation, CANADIAN JEWISH
NEWS, Apr. 10, 2003, at 33 (Lexis 2010).
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V. THE COMPULSORY COMPLEMENTARY JURISDICTION OF THE ICC
OVER WAR CRIMES
Reading China's opposition to the extension of the concept of war
crimes to internal armed conflicts closely, it seems that China's bottom
line is not as rigid as denying the criminality of war related offenses in
internal armed conflicts. Rather, the core of China's claim is the
insistence that the jurisdiction over such crimes should remain in the
hand of domestic courts. 0 5  Indeed, when the UN Security Council
established the ICTR, even though China abstained, China did not
explicitly oppose the criminalization of common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II as stipulated in Article 4 of the ICTR Statute. 1
06
China did, however, stress that "[t]he establishment of an international
tribunal for the prosecution of those who are responsible for crimes that
gravely violate international humanitarian law is a special measure taken
by the international community to handle certain special problems," and
that "[i]t is only a supplement to domestic criminal jurisdiction and the
current exercise of universal jurisdiction over certain international
crimes." 10 7 Thus, China appears more concerned about the compulsory,
albeit complementary, jurisdiction of the ICC upon ratification over war
crimes in internal armed conflicts without its further consent, and
perhaps possible assertions of universal jurisdiction by third states over
such crimes, than the criminality of war related offenses in internal
armed conflicts itself. While granting the ICC with compulsory
complementary jurisdiction over war crimes in internal armed conflicts is
with sound reasons, immediate alternatives for China's opposition do not
seem to exist as of yet. 108 Time is still needed for China to accept such
"intrusive" jurisdiction.
Admittedly, as China claimed, states with robust legal systems are
capable of prosecuting war crimes in internal armed conflicts.
10 9
Domestic courts have apparent advantages over the ICC in prosecuting
these crimes since:
(a) all those involved would be working within the context of an
established legal system, including existing bilateral and multilateral
arrangements; (b) the applicable law would be more certain and more
developed; (c) the prosecution would be less complicated, because it
105. See generally Guangya Wang, supra note 8.
106. China's main reason for abstention was that the Rwanda government still found
the draft resolution and statute difficult to accept. For details, see U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 3453d mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994).
107. Id.
108. See Bing Bing Jia, China and the ICC: The Current Situation, 10 SYBIL 1, 9-10
(2006), available at http://law.nus.edu.sg/sybil/downloads/current/JiaSYBIL_2006.pdf.
109. See Guangya Wang, supra note 8.
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would be based on familiar precedents and rules; (d) both prosecution
and defense were likely to be less expensive; (e) evidence and
witnesses would normally be more readily available; (f) language
problems would be minimized; (g) local courts would apply
established means for obtaining evidence and testimony, including
application of rules relating to perjury; and (h) penalties would be
clearly defined and readily enforceable.., also... States had a vital
interest in remaining responsible and accountable for prosecuting
violations of their laws-which also served the interest of the
international community, inasmuch as national systems would be
expected to maintain and enforce adherence to international standards
of behavior within their own jurisdiction. 110
Furthermore, as Theodor Meron observed:
Proceedings conducted close to home may be better followed than
those in a distant forum and would serve to educate people more fully
about atrocities that took place in their country. Moreover,
condemnation of atrocities by the country's own legal system might
more powerfully inspire the local populace to condemn the atrocities
themselves. 1 I
Realistically speaking, however, depriving the ICC's compulsory
complementary jurisdiction upon ratification over war crimes in internal
armed conflicts would go against much of the very reasoning of creating
it in the first place. Nowadays, most armed conflicts are internal.
National courts, however, will only rarely try their own nationals where
war crimes are concerned, and even more rarely where crimes against
humanity or genocide are concerned."l 2  More importantly,
"[h]istorically agents of the state themselves often were complicit in or
even directing the crimes later referred to international tribunals ...
Conditioning the ICC's jurisdiction on the acceptance of the leadership
of such states would have frustrated the court's ability to end
impunity."' 13 The inclusion of war crimes in internal armed conflicts in
the ICC's compulsory jurisdiction would contribute to the strengthening
of the ICC and the punishment of international crimes.
110. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/50/22(SUPP) (1995) 31.
11. Meron, War Crimes, supra note 54, at 564.
112. Philippe Sands, After Pinochet: the Role of National Courts, in FROM
NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 72
(Philippe Sands ed. 2003); see also Meron, War Crimes, supra note 54, at 554, citing
Adam Roberts, Land Warfare: From Hague to Nuremberg, in THE LAWS OF WAR:
CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 116, 126 (Michael Howard et al.
eds., 1994).
113. Philippe Kirsch, Introductory Remarks, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS 2 (Mauro Politi & Federica Gioia eds., 2007).
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For concerns about possible politicized prosecutions, the
complementarity principle under the Rome Statute would give the
desired priority to national prosecutions. That said, however, it is
unlikely that states with less developed criminal judicial systems would
feel easy and be willing to have the ICC monitoring over their domestic
affairs. Even with regard to states parties, their nervousness about the
scope of war crimes prosecutions is evidenced in the extremely precise
and complex provisions of Article 8, which were cloaked in rhetoric
about the need for precision in legal texts and the sanctity of the principle
of legality. 
114
During the Rome Conference, the Chinese government and many
other non-party states saw the ICC's complementary nature as a
proactive one. The Chinese government viewed the ICC as having been
granted the power to make the final judgment as to whether a state
(including a non-party state) is willing or able to prosecute its own
nationals, thereby turning the ICC into a supranational judicial body
overriding states. 115  Whereas in fact, consistent with China's own
emphasis, 116 the purpose of the complementarity principle is to promote
all countries to improve their domestic judicial systems and guarantee
that they exercise jurisdiction over perpetrators of grave crimes
accordingly. 117 Indeed, the Preamble (paragraph 6) of the Rome Statute
recalls "the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over
those responsible for international crimes."' 1 8 The ICC is, to a large
extent, an international jurisdictional safety net, thus more of a utilitarian
institution than a utopian one. 119 The complementary principle is exactly
designed to reassure the primacy of state criminal jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the deficiencies of its present judicial system and the
strong ideology of absolute state sovereignty have resulted in China's
diffidence and fear that it would be easily deemed falling short of the
"willingness" and "ability" standards of the Rome Statute. This fear
would be best overcome through both China's endeavor to further
improve its national judicial system, especially substantive and
114. See SCHABAS, supra note 79, at 117.
115. See Jie Xu, The Rome Statute and the Rule of Pacta Tertiis Nec Nocent Nec
Prosunt, LAW REVIEW (in Chinese), No. 2, 94, 96-7 (1999) (summarizing the explanatory
statement by the Chinese delegation at the vote on the Rome Statute, and the statement by
the Chinese delegation on "The Establishment of ICC" at the 53rd UN General
Assembly).
116. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, China and the
international Criminal Court, Oct. 28, 2003, available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/
zzjg/tyfls/tyfl/2626/2627/tl 5473.htm.
117. See id.
118. See Rome Statute, supra note 1.
119. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Editorial Comment, Where is the ICC Heading? The ICC-
Quo Vadis?, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 421, 422 (2006).
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procedural criminal law, 120  and ICC's endeavor to prove its
objectiveness and impartiality in reviewing states' judicial systems in the
coming years. In fact, Wenqi Zhu expressed that China should have
confidence in its judicial system, for there have been great improvements
of the country in all aspects, especially in economic and legal
constructions ever since the reform and opening-up policy in the late
1980s. 12 1 Therefore, China should shift its thinking to view the ICC's
complementary nature as a passive one. Just like what states parties are
doing, the most important thing for China is to proactively improve its
national judicial system to make full use of the complementarity
principle because non-party states may still come under the purview of
the ICC. 122 This would also further promote the overall integration of
China within the international legal system, as already shown by China's
integration into the WTO system.
VI. WAR CRIMES PROVISIONS UNDER THE ROME STATUTE EXCEEDING
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Apart from the fact that the extension of the concept of war crimes
to internal armed conflicts under the Rome Statute is itself arguably
already an expansion of the existing customary international law
(consistent with China's first objection vis-A-vis war crimes under the
Rome Statute), some of the specific provisions applicable to war crimes
in internal armed conflicts under the Rome Statute went even beyond
Additional Protocol II (consistent with China's second objection vis-A-
vis war crimes under the Rome Statute), while the customary status of
Additional Protocol II as a whole is still not free from contest.1
2 3
Because China is a party to the four Geneva Conventions and both
Additional Protocol I and II, if the war crimes provisions under the Rome
Statute strictly followed these conventions and the two protocols,
presumably China would have much less opposition. The specific excess
of customary international law by war crimes provisions under the Rome
Statute comprises of two aspects. First, the threshold under the Rome
Statute for situations amounting to internal armed conflicts was even
lower than that of Additional Protocol 11 24 Second, some new crimes or
new contents were added to the list of war crimes (even for international
120. Presently, the Chinese Criminal Code has no provision on any of the
international crimes under the Rome Statute.
121. Wenqi Zhu, Whether China Should Join the International Criminal Court
(Lower), HUBEI SOCIAL SCIENCES (in Chinese), No. 10, 133, 137 (2007) [hereinafter Zhu,
Whether China Should Join (Lower)].
122. See infra Part VIII.A.
123. See supra Part III.
124. See infra Part VIA.
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armed conflicts) under the Rome Statute. 125 However, these expansions
do not pose real difficulty for China if it wishes to ratify the Rome
Statute.
A. The Lowered Threshold for Situations Amounting to Internal Armed
Conflicts
To date, none of the conventional international humanitarian law
applicable to armed conflicts has attempted to directly define the term
"armed conflict." Instead, they chose to negatively define it by
enumerating situations failing to reach such status. The Rome Statute in
its Article 8(2)(c)&(e) precludes "situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts
of a similar nature" from its scope of internal armed conflicts. 126 This
approach is a word for word direct transplant of Article 1(2) of
Additional Protocol 11.127 Indeed, the Rome Statute failed to contribute
to easing the identification of an armed conflict not of an international
character. 128
Nevertheless, the Rome Statute through its Article 8(2)(f)
dramatically lowered the threshold for internal armed conflicts from that
of Additional Protocol II.129 To be specific, according to Article 8(2)(f)
of the Rome Statute, Article 8(2)(e),the paragraph that enumerates "other
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts
not of an international character," applies to "armed conflicts that take
place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups"13 . Whereas the threshold under Additional
Protocol II according to its Article 1 (1) is:
This Protocol ... shall apply to all armed conflicts [which are not of
an international character] and which take place in the territory of a
High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed
forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to
125. See infra Part VI.B.
126. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(c)&(e).
127. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 1(2), available at
http://www.icrc.ch/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/d67c3971 bcffl ci 0ct 2
5641eOO52b545 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
128. Sandesh Sivakumaran, Chapter 20: Identifying an Armed Conflict Not of an
International Character, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 363, 380 (Carsten Stahn & Goran Sluiter eds., 2009).
129. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(f).
130. Id. art. 8(2)(e) (emphasis added).
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enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations
and to implement this Protocol. 
131
Given the differences in the choice and specificity of wording
emphasized in the preceding quote, Article 8(2)(f) clearly represents a
dramatic lowering of the threshold from that of Additional Protocol II,
and broadens the jurisdiction of the ICC significantly. 132
Moreover, the Rome Statute confused matters somewhat with its
use of different words in the different provisions of Article 8(2).
133
Given that Article 8(2)(f) refers to Article 8(2)(e), but not Article 8(2)(c)
that enumerates serious violations of common Article 3, the Rome
Statute on its face arguably distinguishes the thresholds for "serious
violations of common Article 3" and "other serious violations of the laws
and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international
character."1 34 Indeed, such distinction was preferred by Egypt, Sudan,
and Bahrain at the Rome Conference. 135 These states proposed a higher
threshold for the latter along the line of that laid down in Additional
Protocol 11.136 While some states responded that following Additional
Protocol II would set too high a threshold excluding conflicts between
armed groups and conflicts in which the armed group did not exercise
territorial control, 137 others, including China, had welcomed this
proposal.138 Still, others were opposed to the inclusion of any provision
131. Additional Protocol II, supra note 127, art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
132. See also MOIR, supra note 36, at 167.
133. Sivakumaran, supra note 128.
134. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(f).
135. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, 115, UN Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26 (Nov. 20, 1998) (Egypt); United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
June 15-July 17, 1998, 64, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1I/SR.28 (Nov. 20, 1998) (Sudan);
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, 21, UN Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27 (Nov. 20, 1998) (Bahrain).
136. See id.
137. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, 14, UN Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.33 (Nov. 20, 1998) (Austria on behalf of the member States of the
European Union); United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, 60, UN Doc.
A/CONF. 183/C. I/SR.34, (Nov. 20, 1998) (South Africa on behalf of the member States
of the Southern African Development Community); United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
June 15-July 17, 1998, 107, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.34 (Nov. 20, 1998)
(Australia).
138. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, 40, UN Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.I/SR.33 (Nov. 20, 1998) (China); United Nations Diplomatic
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on war crimes in non-international armed conflicts. 139 Thus the final
version of Article 8(2)(f) could be seen as a compromise between states
that preferred no distinction at all and states that preferred the higher
Additional Protocol II threshold for serious violations other than that of
common Article 3.140 Nevertheless, one trial chamber of the ICTY
14 1
and some commentators have concluded that Article 8(2)(f) has not
created a new threshold. 142 They argued that
[firom a lex ferenda perspective, to create a new threshold between
armed conflicts and protracted armed conflicts is inadvisable for it is
to discriminate within armed conflicts not of an international
character in addition to the more traditional discrimination that exists
between non-international armed conflicts and their international
counterparts. And this is at a time in which it is starting to be
recognized that, that which is prohibited in international armed
conflicts should also be prohibited in non-international armed
conflicts. It is also to introduce a criterion which may be particularly
hard to evidence the line between protracted and not protracted being
difficult to draw. 143
Resolution of this issue still awaits the ICC's future interpretation
when it actually encounters this problem in a given case. What is telling
here is that states try every effort to exclude the application of
international humanitarian law by insisting on setting and upholding
different thresholds for different levels of internal violence, ranging from
mere "internal disturbances and tensions," to internal armed conflicts
first passing the lowest common Article 3 threshold, then passing the
intermediate Rome Statute threshold, and finally passing the highest
Additional Protocol II threshold. In reality, however, it is often very
difficult to clearly distinguish between these different levels of violence.
Not to mention that violence is a chameleon that often fluidly glides
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
June 15-July 17, 1998, 73, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35 (Nov. 20, 1998)
(Portugal).
139. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, 6, UN Doc.
A/CONF.183/C. 1/SR.36 (Nov. 20, 1998) (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya).
140. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(f).
141. Prosecutor v Limaj, Bala and Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, 87
(Nov. 30, 2005).
142. See THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 309 (1998); see also
Claus Kress, War Crimes Committed in Non-International Armed Conflict and the
Emerging System of International Criminal Justice, 30 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 118-9 (2000); see also Peter Rowe, War Crimes, in THE PERMANENT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 203, 210 (D. McGoldrick et
al. eds., 2004).
143. Sivakumaran, supra note 128, at 375.
2010]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
either upwards into a higher level of intensity or downwards into a lower
form of force, leaving us with extreme difficulties in determining exactly
when such transformation took place. As a result, states are left with
great leeway in interpreting international humanitarian law applicable to
internal armed conflicts.144  As Theodor Meron noted, one of the
inherent weaknesses of international humanitarian law is "[t]he
possibility to argue, as governments frequently do, that a particular
humanitarian law instrument is inapplicable to a given conflict situation.
As Professor Richard Baxter puts it, 'the first line of defense against
international humanitarian law is to deny that it applies at all.
'i '" 45
With regard to China's real concerns vis-A-vis war crimes in internal
armed conflicts under the Rome Statute (i.e., the Taiwan issue, and to a
lesser degree, possible recurrences of separatist/terrorist violence in Tibet
and Xinjiang provinces), this article proposes that the fact that the
threshold for internal armed conflicts under the Rome Statute is lower
than that of Additional Protocol II would not make much difference vis-
A-vis China's situation. To be specific, even if the Rome Statute strictly
followed the Additional Protocol I1 threshold, the hypothetical use of
force between mainland China and Taiwan would most likely either
remain within situations of "internal disturbances and tensions," or
qualify as an internal armed conflict even under this higher threshold.
This is because, first of all, the Chinese government would prefer to
resolve the Taiwan issue by peaceful means to the farthest extent
possible. 146 To the extent that peaceful means is no longer an option in
the Chinese government's view, so that it has to resort to the use of force,
then presumably China would want to achieve its reunion goal within the
shortest span of violence. If the Chinese government is successful, the
short lived violence could be interpreted as falling short of an "armed
conflict." But in the scenario that the Chinese government failed to
succeed within a short span of violence, then arguably the protracted
violence between mainland China and Taiwan would satisfy as an
internal armed conflict even under the Additional Protocol II threshold,
or even be treated as an international armed conflict. 147  Potential
recurrences of separatist/terrorist violence in Tibet and Xinjiang
provinces, on the other hand, would most likely fall short of "armed
144. See also, MOHAMED ABDELSALAM BABIKER, APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO THE ARMED CONFLICTS OF THE SUDAN:
COMPLEMENTARY OR MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE REGIMES? 67-9 (2007).
145. Theodor Meron, Convergence of International Humanitarian Law and Human
Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 97, 102 (Daniel Warner ed.,
1997).
146. See infra Part VII.A.
147. See infra Part VII.C.
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conflicts" and safely come under "situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts
of a similar nature." In other words, such low intensity violence would
fall outside of the ICC's reach for war crimes purposes. Nevertheless,
low intensity violence events trigger China's concerns for the ICC's
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity in peacetime. 148
B. New Crimes and New Contents
In addition to provisions reflecting the terms of the Hague
Regulations and Additional Protocol I, new crimes and new contents
added to the list of war crimes under the Rome Statute in the context of
international armed conflicts include attacks against humanitarian or
peacekeeping missions, 149  sexual offenses, 5° the conscription or
enlistment of child soldiers,15 1 attacks causing severe environmental
damages, 112 population transfers by the occupying power, 153 and the use
of human shields. 154 Among them, the first three are also included in the
context of internal armed conflicts.
155
None of these new crimes or new contents, either in the context of
international or internal armed conflicts, seems to pose any real difficulty
for China. The only minor problem for China may lie in the phrase
"conscripting or enlisting children. . . into the national armed forces or
using them to participate actively in hostilities."' 15 6  Some Chinese
scholars considered that the second "or" in this phrase should be
substituted by "and," otherwise this provision would be too strict.
157
This is because many state armies have their own colleges for physical or
artistic trainings.158 Some of these trainings need to begin at an early
age. If conscripting or enlisting children into the national armies for the
purposes of receiving these trainings would in itself amount to a war
crime, rather than using them to participate in hostilities as well, such
148. See infra Part VIII.C.
149. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(iii).
150. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxii).
151. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi).
152. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
153. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(viii).
154. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii).
155. For more detailed discussions on these new crimes and new content, see
SCHABAS, supra note 79, at 124-130.
156. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) (emphasis added).
157. See Lijun Yang, An Initial Analysis of the Rome Statute Establishing the
International Criminal Court, GLOBAL L. R. (in Chinese), 218, 225 (Summer 2003); see
also, Lijun Yang, Some Critical Remarks on the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 2 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 599, 612.
158. See supra note 157.
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provision would seem too draconian. 159  In practice, China has
conscripted or enlisted many children under the age of fifteen into its
armies to participate in artistic and physical activities, and has achieved
very good results and effects.' 60 These scholars hence viewed that it is
obvious that such practice should not be negated and suggested that
China must draft its own war crimes provisions in order to avoid such
adverse result. 161 This article submits that even if China does not itself
draft any related provisions, this issue can still be resolved through
reasonable interpretation of the provision in question, including its
purposes, under the Rome Statute in accordance with treaty interpretation
provisions under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Articles
31 and 32.162
VII. THE TAIWAN ISSUE-THE CORE OF CHINA'S REAL CONCERNS
The Taiwan issue is at the core of China's real concerns behind its
official reasons against the extension of the concept of war crimes to
internal armed conflicts both under the Rome Statute and under existing
customary international law. Such extension could result in the ICC's
interference with China's internal affairs, making the Taiwan issue
potentially the most fatal conflict between China and the ICC. To a
lesser degree for concerns of war crimes, possible recurrences of
separatist/terrorist violence in the Tibet and Xinjiang provinces are also
within China's real concerns. As discussed supra, such violence would
most likely come under situations of "internal disturbances and tensions"
which are explicitly excluded from the ICC's reach for war crimes
purposes. 163  However, they trigger China's concerns for the ICC's
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity in peacetime.164 As the issue
of war crimes is the focus of this article, detailed discussion is limited to
China's real concerns over the Taiwan issue. My general conclusion is
that the Chinese government is being overly cautious on the Taiwan
issue vis-A-vis possible reaches by the ICC for war crimes purposes.
First, the outbreak of a cross-strait armed conflict between mainland
China and Taiwan is highly unlikely. 165  Second, even if a cross-strait
armed conflict unfortunately becomes a reality, there are many
159. Id.
160. Youxue Lu, The Study on Domestic Legislation of War Crimes, MODERN L. SCd.
(in Chinese), 2007, Vol. 29, No. 2, 186, 191 (2007).
161. Id.
162. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331 at arts. 31-
32.
163. See supra Part VI.A.
164. See infra Part VIII.C.
165. See infra Part VII.A.
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safeguards in the Rome Statute against possible politicized
prosecutions.1 66 Third, China's oppositions against the extension of the
concept of war crimes to internal armed conflicts under the Rome Statute
would become much less meaningful if the nature of a cross-strait armed
conflict becomes, or would nevertheless be treated as an international
one when it actually occurs. 16 7  Fourth, disregarding the nature of a
hypothetical cross-strait armed conflict, whether international or internal,
current international political reality indicates that it would most likely
be politically infeasible for the ICC to go after relatively powerful states
parties and, arguably, non-party states unless referred by the UN Security
Council in highly controversial situations involving politically sensitive
issues at least for the foreseeable future. 
168
A. The Outbreak of a Hypothetical Cross-Strait Armed Conflict Highly
Unlikely
My first presumption is that the outbreak of a cross-strait armed
conflict between mainland China and Taiwan is highly unlikely, though
it cannot be categorically precluded. China is committed to realizing
national reunification by peaceful means to the farthest extent
possible, 169 though it does not renounce the possibility of using force as a
last resort. 170 Resorting to a full scale "armed conflict" to solve the
Taiwan issue would incur enormous and arguably too high a cost for
China as a whole. It would possibly destroy much of mainland China's
development since the 1978 reform and opening-up policy, and also
Taiwan's development since 1949 when the defeated Kuomintang Party
fled there. Thus, going to war would not be in the best interest of the
entire Chinese population on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Admittedly, the road for China to solve the Taiwan issue in a
peaceful manner has been, and continues to be, a bumpy one. Sixty
years has passed since the creation of this issue as a legacy of the 1945-
1949 Chinese civil war (second phase). 171 During this period, cross-
strait relations periodically alternated between tensions and relaxations,
but had been especially exacerbated during the eight-year rule of the
Democratic Progressive Party (2000-2008) in Taiwan that fanatically
166. See infra Part VII.B.
167. See infra Part VII.C.
168. See infra Part VII.D.
169. Anti-Secession Law, art. 5 (Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 14, 2005, effective Mar.
14, 2005), available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/20051h/122724.htm.
170. Id. art. 8.
171. For more information on the Chinese civil war, see http://www.global
security.org/military/ops/chinese-civil-war.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2010).
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propagandized for the independence of Taiwan.172  Gratifyingly, the
Kuomintang Party reassumed power in Taiwan in March 2008 and
claimed to return to the "1992 Consensus" (one China principle allowing
different oral interpretations). 173 In addition, both the "referendum" for
Taiwan's "accession" to the UN and the "referendum" for Taiwan's
"return" to the UN had been unsuccessful. 74 In December 2008, current
Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou promoted the final realization of the
cross-strait "Three Direct Links" (mail, air and shipping services and
trade).'75 At the turn of the New Year of 2009, mainland Chinese
President Hu Jintao appealed for the formal end of cross-strait hostility
and proposed six recommendations to Taiwan, including the
establishment of a military mutual trust mechanism. 176 The Taiwanese
official spokesman responded positively the next day, although at the
same time appealed for mainland Chinese government's concern and
respect for Taiwanese population's different views. 177 These two most
recent events signaled a significant improvement of cross-strait relations
and hopefully would lead to continuous prospect for a better future.
Both mainland China and Taiwan should seize and maximize the current
optimal opportunity to speed up the peaceful reunion agenda.
Nevertheless, so long as Taiwan is not reunited with mainland
China, the possibility of using force as a last resort for reunion purposes
cannot be categorically excluded. Thus the possibility of civilian
casualties (on both sides) cannot be precluded. If such regrettable things
came to pass, however, this article submits that there are many
safeguards in the Rome Statute, both overall and war crimes specific,
against possible politicized prosecutions that are of concerns to the
Chinese government.
172. For more information on the Democratic Progressive Party, see
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/dpp.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2010).
173. For more information on the "1992 Consensus," see http://www.china
daily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-10/13/content_382076.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2010).
174. In fact, the low number of voters (both less than 36%) participating in both
referenda meant that neither was able to even reach the minimum threshold of
participation by 50% of all eligible voters to become effective. See Chen Shui-bian,
Government's "referendum for Taiwan's accession to the UN" Denied by the Taiwanese
Population, TAIWAN PEOPLE'S DAILY, Mar. 22, 2008, available at http://tw.people.com.
cn/GB/14812/14875/7032361 .htm (in Chinese).
175. Mark McDonald, Taiwan and China Restore Air Links, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/world/asia/16taiwan.html?_r=
1 &scp=l &sq=China%20&%20Taiwan&st=-cse.
176. Hu Jintao Appeals for the End of Cross-Straits Hostility, XINHUA DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Jan. 1, 2009, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2009-01/01/
content 10587961 .htm.
177. Taiwan Positively Responds to Mainland China's Appeal to End Cross-Straits
Hostility, WALL ST. J. DIGITAL NETWORK, Jan. 1, 2009, available at
http://chinese.wsj.com/gb/20090102/BCH009779.asp?source=channel.
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B. Safeguards under the Rome Statute
Even if a hypothetical cross-strait armed conflict unfortunately
breaks out, this article submits that there are many safeguards under the
Rome Statute against possible politicized prosecutions that are of
concerns to the China government. To begin with, the complementarity
principle 7 8 and the high gravity threshold of crimes are two overall
safeguards under the Rome Statute. Both the Preamble in paragraph
10179 and Article 1180 of the Rome Statute emphasize the ICC's
complementary nature to national criminal jurisdictions; and both the
Preamble in paragraph 9181 and Article 5(1)182 stress that the ICC's
jurisdiction is limited to "the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole." 183 Article 1 7(1)(d) explicitly states
that the ICC shall determine a case inadmissible if it is not of sufficient
gravity to justify further action by the ICC. 184  Thus, only very few
serious war crimes incidences, if any at all, would come under the
purview of the ICC should China be unwilling or unable to prosecute its
own nationals.
Apart from overall safeguards, there are also many war crimes
specific safeguards within the Rome Statute. First, Article 8(1) of the
Rome Statute stresses that the ICC shall have jurisdiction in respect of
war crimes "in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or
as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes." 185 As correctly
cited by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case, 186 Chinese
military instructions ever since Mao Tse-Tung's time have included the
"Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention,"
among which humanitarian rules of not to "ill-treat captives," "pillage
civilians' properties," "damage crops," or "take liberties with women" all
reflect China's eminent tradition of caring for civilians.18 7 Thus, if these
official military instructions were fully followed in actual military
actions, it would be difficult to legally characterize mainland China's
military actions for reunion purposes as war crimes committed against
178. See supra Part V.
179. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. 10.
180. Id. art. 1.
181. Id. pmbl. 9.
182. Id. art. 5(1).
183. Id.
184. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(l)(d).
185. Id. art. 8(1) (emphasis added).
186. Tadic Defence Motion, supra note 53, at 102.
187. Chinese People's Liberation Army Discipline Regulation, art. 2 (promulgated by
the Central Military Commission, Jan. 27, 1984), reprinted in David C. Rodearmel,
Military Law in Communist China: Development, Structure and Function, 119 MIL. L.
REV. 1, 16-18 (1988).
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Taiwanese civilians "as part of a plan or policy," even if civilian
casualties were inevitably involved. Admittedly, whether such military
instructions would be fully complied with remains the question. The key
point is that as long as China demonstrates its willingness and ability to
prosecute its own nationals when such military instructions are violated,
the reach of the ICC would be barred. Article 8(1), nevertheless, adds
the phrase "in particular" before the phrase "as part of a plan or
policy."1 88 This means that the latter qualification is not exclusive for
the ICC's jurisdiction. But arguably other safeguards within the Rome
Statute would be able to limit any unreasonable expansion.
Second, Article 8(2)(d) and (f) explicitly exclude "situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic
acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature" from the ICC's
jurisdiction. 189 As mentioned supra, this exclusion should assure the
Chinese government that separatist/terrorist violence in Tibet and
Xinjiang provinces, and also similar cross-strait violence would fall short
of "armed conflicts" under the Rome Statute, though they may trigger
concerns of the ICC's jurisdiction over crimes against humanity during
peacetime for the Chinese government.1 90  Furthermore, overriding
Article 8(2)(c) and (e),191 which define and enumerate war crimes in
internal armed conflicts, Article 8(3)192 states that "[n]othing in
paragraph 2 (c) and (e) shall affect the responsibility of a Government to
maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the unity
and territorial integrity of the State, by all legitimate means."' 93  In
addition, the Preamble in paragraph 7 reaffirms "the Purposes and
Principles of the Charter of the [UN], and in particular that all States
shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the [UN],"' 194 and in paragraph 8
emphasizes "nothing in this Statute shall be taken as authorizing any
State Party to intervene in an armed conflict or in the internal affairs of
any State."' 
95
Third, Article 124 of the Rome Statute allows states parties to opt
out of the ICC's jurisdiction over war crimes for seven years when they
ratify the Rome Statute. 196 France and Colombia, for instance, made
188. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(1).
189. Id. art. 8(2)(d), (f).
190. See infra Part VIII.C.
191. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(c), (e).
192. Id. art. 8(3).
193. Id.
194. Id. at pmbl. 7.
195. Id. at pmbl. 8.
196. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 124.
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such declarations when they ratified the Rome Statute. 197 This interim
opt-out mechanism was originally proposed by the United States as it
believed that such transition period is important for its government to
evaluate the performance of the ICC and to attract a broad range of
governments to join the Rome Statute in its early years. 198 Thus, China
could also resort to this device as a buffer against its concerns. China
could also decide to withdraw from the Rome Statute after the expiration
of the seven-year period (if renewal is not possible), though this
withdrawal option would arguably damage China's international
reputation to such an extent that it may be wise not to resort to such an
option unless absolutely necessary for national interests concerns.
Paradoxically, this seven-year mechanism is only available to states
parties but not non-party states, putting the latter in an unequal position
towards the former.199 This is an internal flaw of the Rome Statute
whereby amendments should be considered as to put all states on the
same footing. One might envision the possibility of a UN Security
Council's decision to override a state party's opt-out capability. But, the
prerequisite is that the UN Security Council is willing to override such an
opt-out capability. Also, a P-5's opt-out would remain untouched
because of the veto power.2 °° It should be noted that Article 124
provides that itself shall be reviewed at the first Review Conference for
the Rome Statute.20  Therefore, we would have to wait and see how the
ASP approaches this issue at the forthcoming 2010 Review Conference,
whether abandoning it all together, amending it to put all states on the
same footing, and/or allow for extension or renewal.
It should also be cautioned that there are many ambiguities in the
Rome Statute, whether intentional or unintentional as the result of the
rushed negotiations during the Rome Conference. On the one hand,
these ambiguities inevitably create room for different interpretations, and
open the possibility for politicized misinterpretations. For instance, how
does one demarcate the line between "international armed conflicts" and
"internal armed conflicts," and between "armed conflicts" and "internal
197. Examples of such declarations can be viewed at Statute of the ICC-Colombia
Reservation Text, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/a/6d97c3e21 ccf24e2412566bb002f5c 1 a?
opendocument (last visited Apr. 26, 2010); Statute of the ICC-France Reservation Text,
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/NORM/909EEAAE157FBD43412566EI 00542BDE?Open
Document (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
198. Is A UN International Criminal Court in the US National Interest?: Hearing
before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, 105th Cong. 13-14 (1998) (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer), available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/IstSesPrepComSenatecfr.pdf
199. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 124.
200. See U.N. Charter, art. 27(3).
201. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 124.
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disturbances and tensions" for marginal cases? 20 2  What are the
boundaries of "internal affairs" and "legitimate means?" 203  Indeed,
unlike conventional law violations, the customary law violations set out
in Article 8 of the Rome Statute "are open to interpretation, particularly
with respect to prohibited weapons and weapons of mass destruction.
Between the objective uncertainty of customary law and the desires of
certain [states] for built-in ambiguities, Article 8 is an unwieldy and, in
part, an unclear provision. ', 234  There is also the problem of the
"potentially intrusive powers of international institutions, 2" i.e., the
ICC would arguably be inclined to interpret ambiguous provisions in
favor of establishing its jurisdiction. Therefore, in cases of doubt,
ambiguous provisions should be interpreted in favor of state sovereignty
because of the ICC's encroachment of states' judicial sovereignty in the
first place and its complementary nature to national criminal
jurisdictions.20 6
On the other hand, while China may worry about politicized
misinterpretations, uncertainties and unpredictability created due to
existing ambiguities within the Rome Statute, the argument can cut the
other way. Namely, it is precisely because of these ambiguities that it is
in China's interest to join the ICC in order to fully participate in the
further shaping of the definitions of the international crimes, and
international criminal and humanitarian law in general under the Rome
Statute.20 7 The ultimate question is whether China (and other major non-
party states) wishes to remain passively outside of the ICC process or if
China wishes to take a proactive stance instead.
C. A Real Cross-Strait Armed Conflict is Highly Likely to Become or
be Treated as An International Armed Conflict
My second presumption is that, if a cross-strait armed conflict
breaks out, it is highly likely that third states would intervene and thus
turn the internal armed conflict into an international one. 20 8  If so,
202. Id. art. 8(2)(b).
203. Id. pmbl. 1 8, art. 8(3).
204. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 443, 462 (1999).
205. John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, in THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE ICC: A COMMENTARY 667, 668 (Cassese et al. eds., vol. I, 2002).
206. See also, Phani Dascalopoulou-Livada, The Principle of Complementarity and
Security Council Referrals, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL
JURISDICTIONS 57, 59 (Mauro Politi & Federica Gioia eds., Ashgate Publishers, 2007).
207. See infra Part IX for further discussions on positive reasons for China to join the
ICC.
208. The scenario of third states intervening in support of the Chinese government
solely to fight against Taiwan is first of all highly unlikely, and even if this is the case,
[Vol. 28:4
THE ICC'S JURISDICTION OVER WAR CRIMES
China's objection to the extension of the concept of war crimes to
internal armed conflicts under the ICC's jurisdiction as one of its major
reasons for not ratifying the Rome Statute becomes much less
meaningful, as the ICC would have jurisdiction over international armed
conflicts just as much, or as little as, internal armed conflicts. Mainland
China's bottom line is that the Taiwanese leaders do not declare
independence. Since Taiwan's own military power would presumably
pale in comparison with that of mainland China, my sub-presumption is
that the Taiwanese leaders would not dare to declare independence
unless Taiwan has strong support from a powerful third state(s).
However, the possibility of irrationality of the Taiwanese leaders and
political miscalculations concerning third state(s)' firm support for
Taiwan's independence could not be categorically precluded. Therefore,
in the highly unlikely scenario that a cross-strait armed conflict breaks
out, it is highly likely that it would involve third state(s)' intervention in
support of the Taiwan side, thus turning the original internal armed
conflict into an international one.
In addition, China needs to be prepared to confront possible
arguments that even if third state(s) do not intervene, the cross-strait
armed conflict between mainland China and Taiwan would still be
treated as an international armed conflict due to possible recognition of
belligerency or recognition of state to Taiwan by third states, or even due
to Taiwan's alleged defacto state status.20 9
D. "Safeguards" Due to the Political Limit of the ICC
Disregarding the nature of a hypothetical cross-strait armed conflict
(whether international or internal), if China becomes a state party to the
Rome Statute, current international political reality indicates that it
would most likely be politically infeasible for the ICC to go after
relatively powerful states parties in highly controversial situations
involving politically sensitive issues at least for the foreseeable future.
such intervention on the government side would not turn the internal armed conflict into
an international one because there are no two states involved in conflict with each other.
See BABIKER, supra note 144, at 54-8 for discussions on the issue of internationalized
internal armed conflicts.
209. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 88 (Oxford
University Press 2006)(1979) ("As a matter of general principle, any territorial entity
formally separate and possessing a certain degree of actual power is capable of being, and
ceteris paribus, should be regarded as, a State for general international law purposes.
The denomination sui generis often applied to entities which, for some reason, it is
desired not to characterise as States is of little help."). For more discussions on the issue
of the legal status of Taiwan, see Phil C.W. Chan, The Legal Status of Taiwan and the
Legality of the Use of Force in a Cross-Taiwan Strait Conflict, 8 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 455.
(2009).
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Indeed, as Roberto Toscano noted, "we have to question very frankly the
political ability to prosecute on the part of the ICC because there are
certain targets that are politically more or less off-limits. ' ' 210 This is not
just the ICC's own problem. 2 1 The ICTY confronted similar problems
vis-A-vis NATO's bombing of Belgrade.21 2 Admittedly, this is a big
political problem. But one should not be too shocked, since justice
always had to deal with real existing powers, both at the international
and national levels.
Normatively speaking, double standards should be eliminated, but
this may well be a cruel reality that one has to accept, again, at least for
the foreseeable future. Indeed, it is almost inescapable that the ICC will
prosecute only or mostly cases related to developing states or "failed
states. ' 21 3 The fact that all current situations initiated under the ICC
proceedings solely concern African states and the ICC Prosecutor's
decision not to go after the British soldiers in the Iraq war are the prime
examples, although both are not free of criticism. 214 That said, this
article does not contend that nationals of China, or nationals of any other
relatively more powerful states, are free to commit international crimes
under the ICC without fear of being prosecuted by the ICC. However, in
highly controversial situations entangled with politically sensitive issues,
relatively powerful states are likely to, though regrettably, have better
chances over weaker states in escaping the scrutiny of the ICC over their
actions.
With regards to states' referrals, it is equally unlikely, if not more,
that states would go after each other due to reciprocity and mutual self-
interest concerns. In the highly unlikely scenario that the ICC Prosecutor
decide to investigate a hypothetical cross-strait armed conflict situation,
or that such situation is being referred to the ICC by other states, apart
from making full use of the complementarity principle,215 China could
still try to mobilize the UN Security Council to defer any further
proceedings.216 Nevertheless, such deferral would arguably be difficult
to obtain due to the reverse consensus requirement of all P-5 votes
(proposed by Singapore and approved at the Rome Conference).217 With
regards to UN Security Council referrals, as China enjoys veto power,
210. Theodor Meron (Chair), Round Table: The ICC relationship with national
jurisdictions: what future? in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL
JURISDICTIONS 133, 153 (Mauro Politi & Federica Gioia eds., Ashgate Publishers, 2007).
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. Seeid. at 136.
214. Seeid. at 134, 151.
215. See supra Part V.
216. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 16.
217. Seeid. art. 10.
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whether it remains a non-party or decides to become a state party to the
Rome Statute, there is no need to worry about this possibility under the
current UN Security Council voting structure.2 I
To conclude, the Chinese government is being overly cautious on
the Taiwan issue vis-d-vis possible reaches by the ICC for war crimes
purposes. Apart from concerns over war crimes in internal armed
conflicts, the Chinese government also expressed four other major
reasons for not joining the ICC.219 A discussion about China's concerns
with regards to the ICC would not be complete without analyzing these
four other reasons. Nevertheless, as China's concern over war crimes in
internal armed conflict is the focus of this article, only a brief analysis of
these other issues will be provided in the following so that the reader
may have a more complete picture of the relationship between China and
the ICC.
VIII. CHINA'S OTHER FOUR MAJOR OFFICIAL REASONS FOR NOT
JOINING THE ICC
A. The Broad Jurisdiction of the ICC
At the Rome Conference, China and other non-party states,
including the United States, Russia and India, fiercely attacked the broad
jurisdiction of the ICC. They viewed it as imposing obligations on non-
party states without their consent, as well as violating the principle of
state sovereignty and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
220
China reiterated its view in the explanation of its abstention on the UN
Security Council's referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC: China
cannot accept any exercise of the ICC's jurisdiction against the will of
non-party states and therefore find it difficult to endorse any UN Security
Council authorization of such an exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC. 22
Indeed, the ICC does affect non-party states in that it has been
granted jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states without their
consent in three circumstances.222 First, the ICC has jurisdiction over
referrals by the territorial state that either is already a party to the Rome
218. See U.N. Charter, art. 27(3).
219. See Guangya Wang, supra note 8.
220. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court 37, Jan. 25, 1999, UN Doe. A/CONF.183/SR.9, available
at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GENV99/804/59/PDFV9980459.pdf?
OpenElement.
221. See U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg, at 5, UN Doc. S/PV.5158, (Mar. 31,
2005) available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/SC%20Meeting%2ORecord%201593.pdf.
222. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 12 & 13.
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Statute or otherwise agrees to the ICC's jurisdiction.223 Second, the ICC
has jurisdiction over proprio motu investigations by the ICC Prosecutor
whereby the territorial state either is already a party to the Rome Statute
or otherwise agrees to the ICC's jurisdiction.224 Third, the ICC has
jurisdiction over referrals by the UN Security Council.225  Such
extension of jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states also becomes
problematic should the ICC apply to these nationals provisions that
exceed customary international law at the time their respective crimes are
committed.22 6 Such application would violate the principle of legality
(nullum crimen sine lege) that binds all criminal courts, whether
international, mixed or domestic.227
Realistically speaking, with regards to China itself, the ICC's reach
to Chinese nationals when it remains a non-party state is highly unlikely.
First, a UN Security Council referral of China to the ICC is impossible
due to China's veto power. 228  Second, the ICC's jurisdiction over a
Chinese national committing an ICC crime on a non-Chinese territory is
highly unlikely, because China has few overseas military commitments.
It is also difficult to imagine that Chinese overseas peacekeeping military
forces would have the incentive to commit any crime that is as heinous
as an ICC crime, or that China would be unwilling or unable to prosecute
its own overseas peacekeeping soldiers should they commit an ICC
crime. Indeed it has been reported that "Chinese personnel have a
reputation for tight discipline and have not been tarnished by the sex and
corruption scandals that have afflicted peacekeepers from some other
nations.229 Thus, some Chinese scholars concluded that unlike the
United States (which deploys overseas troops all over the world), China
is not concerned that its overseas troops may one day come under the
ICC's jurisdiction.23° One could argue, however, that even if China is
not concerned right now, the ICC's jurisdiction over its overseas troops
may still be a potential concern for China if and when it decides to
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See Meron, War Crimes, supra note 54, at 577.
227. See id. "A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless
the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court." Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 22.
228. See U.N. Charter, art. 27(3).
229. Andrew Higgins, China showcasing its softer side: Growing role in U.N.
peacekeeping signals desire to project image of benign power, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 2,
2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/Ol/
AR2009120104060.html.
230. See Jianping Lu & Zhixiang Wang, China's Attitude Towards the ICC, 3 J. OF
INT'L CRIM. JUST., 608, 611 (2005) available at http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/
content/abstract/3/3/608.
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engage in greater overseas military activities in the future. Nonetheless,
at least for the foreseeable future, it should be fairly safe to conclude that
China is much more concerned about its own domestic issues (Taiwan,
Tibet, Xinjiang, Falun Gong etc.) and overall national stability and
development than its potential overseas military engagements.
What is really at stake for China, as already revealed in previous
discussions concerning the ICC's jurisdiction over war crimes in internal
armed conflicts, is the "compulsory upon ratification" nature of the
ICC's jurisdiction.23' Indeed, China is unwilling to accept the
compulsory complementary jurisdiction of the ICC, especially over war
232
crimes and crimes against humanity. In China's view, the ICC's
jurisdiction should be based on states' voluntary acceptance.233 This opt-
in system is the key manner in which states accept external
jurisdictions. 34 States should be permitted to choose from whether or
not to accept the ICC's jurisdiction, particularly when considerable
controversies still exist over the scope and definition of crimes under the
Rome Statute.235 In addition, the provisions on war crimes and crimes
against humanity under the Rome Statute incorporated many new crimes
and new contents. These new crimes and new contents entail an
acceptance course for any state.2 36 The taming of the ICC's compulsory
jurisdiction by the complementarity principle does not seem to satisfy
China's concerns.2 37 In fact, this issue is not really a legal obstacle, but
rather, a political obstacle concerning whether China is willing to
concede a compulsory complementary jurisdiction over the international
crimes in question to the ICC, which will later be discussed in relation to
the Chinese government's current political reluctance to join the ICC.238
B. The Proprio Motu Power of the Prosecutor
China has serious reservations over the Prosecutor's power to
initiate investigation proprio motu, which it considers to be exercisable
"without checks and balances against frivolous prosecution," thus
amounting to "the right to judge and rule on State conduct., 239 Apart
231. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(1).
232. See Shiguang Li, supra note 28, at 3.
233. See Guangya Wang, supra note 8.
234. See Jie Xu, supra note 115, at 97.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See supra Part V.
238. See infra Part X.
239. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court 39, Jan. 25, 1999, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.9,
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V99/804/59/PDF/
V9980459.pdfOpenElement.
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from China, more than 30 states, including the United States, Russia, and
India, also expressly opposed the proprio motu power of the Prosecutor
with similar reasons at the Rome Conference. 240 The majority of states,
however, viewed that safeguard provisions under the Rome Statute,
including Article 15 on the pre-authorization by the Pre-Trial Chamber
for the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation, 241 Article 18 on the
Prosecutor's deferral to a state's investigation,242 and other provisions
concerning the control and filtering of the powers of the Prosecutor and
the judges, constitute sufficient limits on the ability of the Prosecutor to
initiate cases.243  In other words, the mechanism concerning the
independent role of the Prosecutor was not created in a vacuum. One
should not evaluate it by severing it from the other parts of the Rome
Statute.244
In fact, the controversy over the proprio motu power of the
Prosecutor is a sub-issue under the issue of the ICC's trigger mechanism.
The latter was one of the most complicated and sensitive issues at the
Rome Conference, because it not only concerns the initiation of the
ICC's proceeding, but also concerns the rights and obligations of states
245parties or non-party states. Looking at Article 13 of the Rome Statute
literally, the states parties, the UN Security Council and the Prosecutor
all have the power to trigger the proceeding of the ICC. 24 6 However, the
power of the Prosecutor seems more important for the operation of the
ICC than the other two. First, the Prosecutor could proactively trigger
the jurisdiction of the ICC when states parties or the UN Security
Council are hesitant to refer cases due to political or other reasons, which
are common in international relations.247 States are loath to attack one
another except on political or ideological grounds, and the UN Security
Council will only rarely muster the political will and the requisite
majority to refer situations to the ICC. 248 Second, the Prosecutor has the
decisive say on which cases or crimes the ICC shall hear, since states
240. See id.; see also United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Nov. 20, 1998, UN Doc.
A/CONF. 183/C.1/SR. 10, available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
V98/574/63/PDF/V9857463.pdfOpenElement.
241. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15.
242. See id. art. 18.
243. See generally id.
244. See Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, The Role of the International Prosecutor,
in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE-ISSUES,
NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 175, 187 (Roy Lee ed., 1999).
245. See Zhu, Whether China Should Join (Lower), supra note 121, at 133.
246. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13.
247. See Zhu, Whether China Should Join (Lower), supra note 121, at 133.
248. Antonio Cassese, Is the ICC Still Having Teething Problems?, 4 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 434, 435 (2006).
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parties and the UN Security Council can only refer "situations" but not
specific "cases" to the ICC.249 Thus the proprio motu power ensures the
potential effectiveness of the ICC to prosecute the most serious
international crimes, and also substantially enhances states' incentive to
ensure accountability through their national legal systems.250
Perhaps a close examination of the Prosecutor's present work would
also help to alleviate China's concerns. As early as September 2003, a
document was produced that outlined a general strategy for the Office of
the Prosecutor and the priorities for its work. 251 This strategy document
reaffirmed that the Office of the Prosecutor, in line with the Rome
Statute, would not only strictly observe the principle of complementarity,
but also promote it as far as possible by supporting national criminal
252justice systems. The Office of the Prosecutor will focus its
investigations and prosecutorial activities on those who bear the greatest
responsibility for core crimes, and has indicated a clear preference for
initiating investigations of alleged core crimes, wherever possible, on the
basis of a referral by a state party or the UN Security Council.25 3 Such
strategy has been reaffirmed by the Office of the Prosecutor in 2006 for
the coming years.254 According to the Office of the Prosecutor's current
record, since July 2002 it has received more than 8,461 communications
from more than 132 countries. 255 To date, three self-referrals from states
parties (Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Central African
Republic) and one referral from the UN Security Council (Darfur,
Sudan) have initiated investigations, and a number of states, including
Afghanistan, Chad, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Palestine, are currently
249. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13.
250. See BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE & THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 79-80 (Oxford
University Press 2003); see Lu & Wang, supra note 160, at 618.
251. See International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some
Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, Sept. 2003, available at
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1 FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/
143594/030905_PolicyPaper.pdf.
252. See id.
253. See Hans-Peter Kaul, Construction Site for More Justice: the International
Criminal Court after Two Years, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 370, 374 (2005).
254. See International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on
Prosecutorial Strategy, Sept. 14, 2006, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
699AA4B3-E8C2-4E41-9EFA-EBA503BDBF7F/143694/OTPProsecutorialStrategy
20060914_English.pdf.
255. See International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Communications,
Referrals and Preliminary Analysis, http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+
of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Comm+and+Ref/Communications+and+Referr
als.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2010).
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under analysis. The stark contrast between the number of
communications received and those that launched investigations reflects
the caution of the Prosecutor, which should give states reassurance and
confidence in the Prosecutor's role and work.
However, the Prosecutor's indictment of Sudanese President Omar
Al Bashir on July 14, 2008, authorized by the Pre-Trial Chamber on
March 4, 2009, has been considered by many states, including Arab and
African states, Russia and China to be imprudent and unwise as it would
hinder efforts to bring peace to the Darfur region.257 Most recently on
March 31, 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber II, by majority, granted the
Prosecutor's request to commence an investigation, using his proprio
motu power for the first time, on crimes against humanity allegedly
committed in Kenya's 2007 post-election violence.258 Nevertheless, it
should be noted that to date, there exists only very few practical works of
the Prosecutor open for assessment. Thus, to change the views of hostile
non-party states and to augment their confidence in the Prosecutor, the
key point is to show consistent prudence, fairness, and continual
improvement in the Prosecutor's work.
C. Crimes against Humanity during Peacetime
China also has reservations on the ICC's jurisdiction over crimes
against humanity during peacetime.259 China views this as contrary to
customary international law, where such crimes should be related only to
wartime, as evidenced by the Nuremberg Charter 260 and the ICTY
Statute. 261  Furthermore, China contends that many types of conduct
listed under the Rome Statute fall under human rights law rather than
international criminal law, thus deviating from the real aim of
establishing the ICC. 262  At the Rome Conference, a considerable
256. International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, http://www.icc-
cpi.intlMenus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor (last visited Apr.
4,2010).
257. See Al Jazeera.net, Court Issues Bashir Arrest Warrant, http://english.
aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/03/20093412473776936.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2010)
("China, the African Union and the Arab League have suggested an indictment could
worsen the Darfur conflict and destabilise the entire region"); Al Jazeera.net, Arab
Leades Snub al-Bashir Warrant, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/
03/2009330175846714662.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
258. See supra note 4.
259. See Guangya Wang, supra note 8.
260. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546,
82 U.N.T.S. 284, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp.
261. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,
1993).
262. See Guangya Wang, supra note 8.
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number of states, mainly those from the Arab League, Africa and Asia,
concurred with China's view.263 These states viewed that "crimes against
humanity were invariably committed in situations involving some type of
armed conflict, as indicated by the ad hoc tribunals . . . and that
customary law had not changed owing to the adoption of human rights
instruments . . . or the [ICTR] Statute. ' ' 264  Many of these states,
including Syrian Arab Republic, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan,
Bahrain, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Tunis, Algeria, Morocco, and Pakistan, even
contended that the ICC should not be granted with jurisdiction over
crimes against humanity in internal armed conflicts.265
The majority of states, however, supported the severance of the
nexus with armed conflict from the definition of crimes against
humanity.266 These states referred to such severance in international
legal documents such as the 1945 Control Council Law No. 10,267 the
1948 Genocide Convention,268 the 1968 Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
269 19730Against Humanity, the 1973 Convention on Apartheid,27 ° the ICTR
Statute,271 and the 1996 International Law Commission's Draft Code of
Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind,272  and
263. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Comm. of the Whole, 3d mtg., 74, UN
Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.3 (June 17, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/
joumal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/CONF. 183/C. 1/SR.3 [hereinafter Rome Conference]; Rome
Conference, 12, 90, Comm. of the Whole, 4th mtg., UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.28
(July 8, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/joumal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/CONF.
183/C. 1/SR.28.
264. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Volume I (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee
During March-April and August 1996), G.A., 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, A/51/22 (1996),
88 [hereinafter Report of the Prep. Com.].
265. See generally Rome Conference, supra note 263.
266. See THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE:
ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 92-93 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
267. See Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and
Against Humanity, Nuremberg Trials Final Report app. D (Dec. 20, 1945), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtl O.asp.
268. See G.A. Res. 260 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 9, 1948).
269. See G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), U.N. Doc. A/7218 (Nov. 26, 1968).
270. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid, opened for signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force
July 18, 1976).
271. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
272. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of
the International Law Commission on Its Forty-eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 51s' Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/5 1/10 (Jan. 1, 1996).
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273jurisprudences such as the ICTY's Tadic case, and argued that the
reference to "armed conflict" in the Nuremberg Charter and the ICTY
Statute was simply a limit on the jurisdiction of the courts, but was not
inherent in the definition of crimes against humanity.274
Within the academia, western commentators have generally viewed
that the definition of crimes against humanity lost the required nexus
with armed conflicts over time based on similar evidences mentioned
above.2 75 While most Chinese scholars seemingly acquiesce to this view
by enumerating the relevant provisions of the abovementioned
international legal instruments and the Rome Statute when discussing
issues on crimes against humanity, cautious Chinese scholars believe
that, relevant customary international law was still ambiguous at the time
when the Rome Statute was adopted.276 Only very few Chinese scholars
explicitly opposed the inclusion of crimes against humanity during
peacetime in the ICC's jurisdiction, viewing that such inclusion plants
hidden danger of interference with states' domestic affairs.277
In fact, whether crimes against humanity should include those
taking place during peacetime as well as wartime can be analyzed by
using the same logic for whether war crimes should include those taking
place in internal armed conflicts as well as international armed conflicts.
Same acts of atrocities should be punished no matter when and where
they take place. Contrary arguments would be logically and morally
difficult to sustain. Nevertheless, Article 7 of the Rome Statute in its
present form does expand existing international law in at least two
respects.278 First, it broadens the classes of conduct amounting to crimes
against humanity. 279 Thus "forced pregnancy," "enforced disappearance
of persons," and "the crime of apartheid" are included.28 ° Second, it
greatly expands the category of discriminatory grounds in dealing with
the crime of persecution.281 While under customary international law
these grounds may be political, racial, ethnic, or religious, Article 7(1)(h)
adds "cultural," "gender," as well as "other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law.,
282
273. See Tadic Defence Motion, supra note 53; see also Report of the Prep. Com.,
supra note 264, 89.
274. See Meron, War Crimes, supra note 54, at 568.
275. See e.g., M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 140 (2003); CASSESE, supra note 54, at 73; Meron, War Crimes, supra note 54, at
568; SCHABAS, supra note 79, at 100.
276. See e.g., Zhu, Whether China Should Join (Upper), supra note 81.
277. See Mingxuan Gao & Junping Wang, supra note 87.
278. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. See id. art. 7(l)(h).
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The Tibet, Xinjiang, and Falun Gong issues are among China's real
concerns here. Especially in light of recent outbreaks of riots in Xinjiang
on July 5, 2009,283 and Tibet on March 14, 2008,284 as well as Falun
Gong's anti-Communist activities before and during the 2008 Beijing
Olympic Games, 285 it is natural for the Chinese government to express
concern that its responses to these incidents, which it views as strictly
falling under its internal affairs and legal under Chinese law, might be
mischaracterized as crimes against humanity during peacetime and thus
invoke the intervention of the ICC. With the development of China's
human rights status, however, together with the rapid improvement of the
national living standards, China's perceptions and standards could
change and conform to a general consensus on this issue.286 It should
also be reiterated that the scope of crimes against humanity is strictly
confined to widespread or systematic attacks against a civilian
population, rather than common violations of human rights.287 The ICC
only deals with the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community, and will not turn into a general court for human rights.288
Therefore, the expansions of crimes against humanity under the Rome
Statute, viewed in light of these safeguards, should not pose any real
difficulty for China.
D. The Crime ofAggression
The Chinese government is of the view that the crime of aggression
is a state act.289 It does not yet have a legal definition. To avoid political
abuse of litigation, it is necessary to have the UN Security Council first
determine the existence of aggression before pursuing individual
criminal responsibility, as is stipulated in Article 39 of the UN
Charter. 29) Thus China viewed that the ICC's jurisdiction over the crime
of aggression weakens the power of the UN Security Council, which
283. See Zhou Yan & Li Laifang, Death toll in Xinjiang riot rises to 140, XINHUA,
July 6, 2009, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/06/content-
11661325.htm.
284. Tibetan riots spread outside region, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/world/asia/16iht-tibet.4.11148124.html.
285. Nishika Patel, Falun Gong cries foul over stricter entry regulations, THE
STANDARD, Mar. 28, 2008, available at http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news-
detail.asp?pp.cat= 11 &art-id=63634&sid = 18243751&conjtype = 1.
286. See also Jia, supra note 108, at 10.
287. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
288. See id. arts. 1-6 (establishing the court and its jurisdiction).
289. See Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations
Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, China and the
International Criminal Court, http://www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/hflygz/t85684.htm (last
visited Apr. 4, 2010).
290. See U.N. Charter, art. 39.
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should first act upon possible cases of aggression, without the limitation
of twelve-month periods. 291 At the Rome Conference, other members of
the P-5 and many other states expressed similar views.292 This important
issue has been reserved under the Rome Statute, and will be discussed at
the 2010 Review Conference.293
Considering that China is one of the P-5, and a relatively recent
victim of aggression prior to 1945, the issue of defining the crime of
aggression should be one of the appealing reasons for it to accede to the
Rome Statute, rather than an obstacle, for only states parties have the
right to participate in the determination process of the definition of the
crime of aggression. Presently, China is only invited as an observer to
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression.9 In addition,
according to Article 121(5) of the Rome Statute, any amendment to the
definitions of the crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC shall enter into
force only for those states parties that have accepted the amendment.295
This means that the evolution of the crime of aggression will be slow and
opens the possibility that the ICC will seldom have jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression. 96 Some scholars even noted that as a practical
297matter, such an amendment might even never happen, and that
discussions about the crime of aggression carry the potential for rousing
greater opposition from the major powers that are currently outside the
ICC.298 Therefore, China's view on this crime does not at all hinder its
consideration of the accession to the ICC.
IX. POSITIVE REASONS FOR CHINA TO JOIN THE ICC
All the previous discussions have centered round the issue of
whether China's official reasons for not joining the ICC pose any real
291. See Guangya Wang, supra note 8.
292. See Rome Conference, Summary Record of the 2d Plenary mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/SR.2 (June 15, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/
ws.asp?m=A/CONF.183/SR.2; Rome Conference, Summary Record of the 3d Plenary
mtg., UN Doc.; UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.3 (June 16, 1998), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/j oumal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/CONF. 1 83/SR.3.
293. See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Review Conference of the
Rome Statute, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod-review (last visited Apr. 4, 2010).
294. See Garth Schofield, The Empty U.S. Chair: United States Nonparticipation in
the Negotiations on the Definition of Aggression (2007), available at
www.amicc.org/.. ./Crime%20of/o20Aggression%20and%20the%20US.pdf.
295. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(5).
296. See BROOMHALL, supra note 250, at 47.
297. See Jerry Fowler, The Rome Treaty for an International Criminal Court: A
Framework of International Justice for Future Generations, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 131, 135 (William
Driscoll et al eds., 2004).
298. See BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF, BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 254
(2008).
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difficulty for its ratification of the Rome Statute. These discussions
would not be complete without analyzing the positive reasons for China
to join the ICC. This section summarizes five of these reasons below.
First, the fact that more and more states are joining the ICC is
arguably already an inevitable trend. China's abstention from
participation in the Rome Statute will prove detrimental to its
international reputation. Especially after the ratification of the Rome
Statute in late 2007 by another major Asian power-Japan, China's non-
party status stands in stark contrast to Japan's exemplary role.299 The
existence of the ICC as a permanent international judicial institution is
already a fact. Currently more than half of all the states in the world are
already states parties to the Rome Statute. The global support for the
ICC is ever increasing. 300 This trend will place the minority opposing
states in a morally isolated plight that is more and more difficult to
justify and sustain.
Jianping Lu noted that the current Chinese official stance vis-A-vis
the ICC reflects a culturally static legal ideology.30' Other Chinese
scholars pointed out that in the regime of international crimes against
humanity, restrictions imposed on state sovereignty are already a fact.30 2
The world has changed and will continue to change rapidly. China can
no longer wishfully rely on the notion of absolute sovereignty. Rather, it
can only strive for proactivity in this course of gradual adaptation. 3°1
Indian scholar Usha Ramanathan similarly cautioned India not to
cynically oppose the ICC with ethnocentricity, but to adopt a universal
idiom "where it is recognized and acted upon that peace anywhere
requires justice everywhere.' 30 4 Therefore, as Sang-Hyun Song (Korea),
the new president of the ICC as of March 11, 2009, put it, if China, a
reputable and responsible big nation in the international society that
plays an important role and exerts significant influences in international
affairs, as well as a leader in the regime of international justice in Asia
299. See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Ratification of the Rome
Statute, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romeratification (last visited Apr. 4, 2010).
300. See id. ("The Rome Statute entered into force after achieving 60 ratifications in
July 2002, decades earlier than predicted. Now, only a few years later, the number of
ratifications has risen from 66 to 105.").
301. Jianping Lu, A Cultural Assessment of China Joining the ICC, in ISSUES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 325 (Bingzhi Zhao &
Hongyi Chen eds., 2003) [hereinafter Jianping Lu, Cultural Assessment].
302. See Wanghuai Sun et al., International Criminal Court: Insufficiency and
Problems of the International Institutions for Criminal Justice, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: CHOICE OF CHINA 50, 61 (Mingxuan Gao et al. eds., 2005).
303. See id.
304. Usha Ramanathan, India and the ICC, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 627, 634 (2005).
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and even in the whole world, could ratify the Rome Statute, such
ratification would send a strong message to the rest of the world.30 5
Second, as a non-party state to the Rome Statute, China cannot
enjoy any right that states parties possess. For one thing, China cannot
participate in the discussions of major issues concerning the ICC. Nor
can it put forward any amendment proposals for the Rome Statute. Take
the crime of aggression for instance. Non-party states can only
participate as observers with no voting power.30 6 Thus non-party states
are precluded from the lawmaking of the definition of the crime of
aggression. Once a definition of the crime of aggression has been
formulated under the Rome Statute, however, it would inevitably have
profound impact on all states in the world including non-party states.
More importantly, relevant laws concerning genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes are still in the process of gradual formulation.
All states are "keenly interested that the law in this field should develop
in directions that are consistent with their views of international
relations, with the extent and nature of their military engagements, as
well as with their visions of what would provide the greatest justice and
deterrence value., 30 7 Hence, the fact that China, as a non-party state,
cannot participate in the discussions of relevant crimes, is obviously
detrimental for the development of relevant international criminal law in
the direction that are consistent with China's views and national
interests. In addition, the creation process of the ICC sufficiently
demonstrates that international criminal law is a fast developing legal
branch that is currently undergoing a high-speed growth period. If China
takes an oppositional, resistant or non-participation stance towards this
important lawmaking process, it could lose its voice in such an important
field and lose a major stage where it could otherwise exert its own
functions.308
For another thing, only nationals of states parties are eligible to be
nominated as candidates for ICC judges and prosecutors. In fact, Asia is
the least represented regional bloc in the current composition of the
ICC's personnel while some critics argued that Anglo-American
influence remains strong in the ICC.309 Currently there are only two
Asian judges, Sang-Hyun Song from Korea and Kuniko Ozaki from
305. Sang-Hyun Song, The ICC: The Concerned Issues of China, 2 INT'L CRIM. L. R.
21-22 (2007).
306. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 112.
307. Madeline Morris, The United States and the ICC: High Crimes and
Misconceptions: the ICC and Non-party States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 13, 33
(2001).
308. See Jianping Lu, Cultural Assessment, supra note 301.
309. See SCHIF, supra note 298, at 180.
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Japan, who was newly elected on November 18, 2009, in the current
composition of ICC judges, which has been designed to be eighteen in
total. 310  Not to mention that there is no Asian representative in the
Office of the Prosecutor. Here, China, another influential Asian country
possessing relevant professionals and expertise, is losing an opportunity
to directly participate in the formulation and development of a new
international organization which may be of use to it, if not for now, at
least for the future. This would also deprive the Chinese legal profession
of valuable learning opportunities that would ultimately amount to costly
tuition fees for the Chinese government and people.3 ' More
importantly, no matter what interpretation and decision it makes in its
adjudications, ICC case precedents would inevitably exert profound
influence on the development of the entire (public) international law,
international criminal law and international relations.31 2 Hence, it would
be very detrimental to China if there are no Chinese legal experts either
within the composition of ICC judges or prosecutors.
In addition, China cannot enjoy current "privileges" given to states
parties by the Rome Statute, such as the exclusion of the ICC's
jurisdiction over war crimes by utilizing the seven-year opt-out
mechanism, 313 and the exclusion of the ICC's jurisdiction over newly
amended crimes unless the state party in question accepted such
amendments. 31 4 These privileges ironically do not apply to non-party
states, which may well come under the jurisdiction of the ICC in some
circumstances as discussed supra.31 5 Of course, they present inherent
flaws within the Rome Statute, and arguably should be amended so that
all states are put on the same footing.
Third, even if China decides not to ratify the Rome Statute, it may
still be passively affected because of the obligations imposed upon non-
party states by the current jurisdictional provisions under the Rome
Statute.316 What is vital at hand is that with regards to an universal
international organization that concerns important areas in international
politics and enjoys a large number of states parties, though non-party
states have the freedom to join or not join, they would inevitably be
charged with considerable pressure by remaining outside of such an
310. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 36(1); The Judges of the Court: International
Criminal Court, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B7346EA2-9E69-
4DD7-928D-A391E2E5F8D7/281533/ICCJudges_09_10_Eng.pdf (last visited Mar. 15,
2010).
311. See Jianping Lu, Cultural Assessment, supra note 301.
312. Zhu, Whether China Should Join (Upper), supra note 81, at 177.
313. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 124.
314. See id. art. 121(5).
315. See supra Part VIII.A.
316. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 12-13.
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organization, and would also have less of a voice than states parties in
relevant international political regimes. 317  In fact, the most negative
possible result of a state's refusal to join international mechanisms such
as the ICC is the possibility of becoming marginalized in international
legal or political relations. 318  As Michael Scharf noted, "the United
States preserves very little by remaining outside the ICC treaty
regime.,' 319 The best way to protect the United States from a potentially
politicized tribunal is not to assume the role of hostile outsider, but rather
to sign the Rome Statute, to play an influential role in the selection of the
ICC's judges and prosecutor, and then provide U.S. personnel to work in
the Office of the Prosecutor.320 Therefore, China should also aim to be
an active participant when it joins the ICC to safeguard international
justice and its own legitimate national interests.
Fourth, the ICC would contribute to the multi-polarization of the
world. Shigui Tan commented that as the world's only superpower, the
United States strives to lead the world in an array of international and
regional issues.321 The United States promotes American values,
ideologies, and political and economic models around the whole globe,
and attempts to establish a unipolar world dominated by itself.3 22 The
trend of multi-polarization in the world reflects profound transformation
of international relations. It carries significant meanings in containing
hegemonism and power politics, promoting world peace and stability,
and advancing the economic prosperity of developing countries. 3 23 The
Rome Statute and the world criminal court thereby established are
precisely the product of the trend of multi-polarization of the
international political configuration post cold war. They reflect the call
for justice and the opposition against great-power politics by the vast
majority of the middle and weaker states.32 4 The ICC's collision with
hegemony makes its value stand out. In fact, some states have signed on
to the Rome Statute precisely because the United States opposes the
ICC. 325 Hence, China and other states can utilize the ICC to contain
American hegemonic policies, and increase their voice in sensitive
317. See Jing Xi, An Analysis of the Reasons of the US's Oppositions to the
International Criminal Court, POLITICS & LAW (in Chinese), No. 6, 56, 57 (2001).
318. See Zhu, Whether China Should Join (Lower), supra note 121, at 137.
319. Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party
States: A Critique of the US. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (2001), available
at http://global.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?64+Law+&+Contemp.+Probs.+67+%28
Winter+2001%29.
320. See id. at 71.
321. See Tan, supra note 85, at 72.
322. See id. at 72-3.
323. See id. at 73.
324. See SCHIFF, supra note 298, at 192.
325. See id. at 180.
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international political regimes such as armed conflicts and ethnic
disputes.326
Fifth, joining the ICC would also be conducive to protecting
Chinese overseas victims. As the implementation of China's reform and
opening-up policy becomes more embedded, more Chinese nationals
have been sent to work abroad. Some of them have even been sent to
war-torn states such as Iraq and some African states.327 If China joins
the ICC, apart from taking its own measures, China can also provide
protections for and realize justice to its overseas victims of crimes under
the Rome Statute through the ICC.
328
In conclusion, Chinese legal scholars have generally voiced that
instead of passively accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC and providing
cooperation to it, China should take a proactive stance by ratifying the
Rome Statute and actively participating in its possible amendments.
Nevertheless, based on China's concerns over its thorny domestic issues
and the current political reluctance of the Chinese government, 329 its
ratification of the Rome Statute cannot be achieved in a short period of
time. This would still involve a process for China,33° whereby China
should strengthen its own academic research and bring its judicial system
in line with the international standards as soon as possible.
X. CURRENT POLITICAL RELUCTANCE OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
TO RATIFY THE ROME STATUTE
All the forgoing analysis has attempted to show that not only
China's official reasons for not joining the ICC pose no real difficulty for
China's accession to the Rome Statute, but that there are also many
positive reasons for China to join the ICC. Assuming that these
arguments hold (at least some) water, then how does one understand
China's current reluctance to join the ICC? This article proposes that
what is really at stake are not legal obstacles, but a lack of political will.
It is the political reluctance of a rising power, who still confronts thorny
domestic issues that are susceptible to mass violence, to be fettered by
yet another multilateral restrictive mechanism. In other words,
sovereignty related political concerns still heavily outweigh all legal
arguments for China's accession to the ICC at this stage. As Benjamin
Schiff noted in the context of the United States:
326. See Jie Xu, supra note 115, at 98.
327. See Zhu, Whether China Should Join (Lower), supra note 121, at 139.
328. See id.
329. See infra Part X.
330. Shaoqian Zhang & Zhanguo Sun, Comparative Study on the Rome Statute and
Chinese Criminal Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CHOICE OF CHINA (in
Chinese) 114, 114 (Mingxuan Gao et al. eds., 2005).
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If U.S. policy makers seek immunity from international jurisdiction
over the three crimes, their legal arguments ... against joining the
[ICC] are irrelevant. Supporting impunity for U.S. citizens can be
justified only on the grounds that other strategic U.S. national
interests override interests in an international rule of law .... This is
a choice wherein sovereignty override legality, and historically most
countries and certainly the United States have readily taken this
position. If on the other hand, policy makers decide that adherence
to the [ICC] would benefit the United States by winning friends, by
strengthening deterrence against international crimes, and by making
available a new institution for serving U.S. interests, then the legal
arguments are also irrelevant where the United States should join.
This argument can equally apply to other non-party states, including
China, except that their respective "irrelevant" legal argument may differ
in their own context.
332
Insight from international relations theories may prove helpful in
explaining states' demurral from accession. First, from the realist
perspective, states avoid relative disadvantage just as they pursue relative
advantage. 333  "States concerned that the ICC might constrain their
independent behavior might oppose the [ICC] more than states lacking
such concerns."3 34 Therefore, the "U.S. opposition to the [ICC], and
Chinese, Russian and Indian reluctance to join [reflect] powerful states'
inclination to preserve maximum flexibility in the use of military power
and disinclination to subordinate themselves to cooperative structures
that do not aid in promoting material objectives., 335 In contrast, "most
of the states that join would expect not to be the scenes of international
criminal law violations or the home states of international criminal law
transgressors, and they would expect that should such crimes occur their
domestic legal institutions would deal with them. 3 36  Second,
"neoliberal institutionalists do not require relative gain as a state interest
absolute gain can suffice. 3 3 7 "If a general problem among states is more
amenable to solution by collective action, neoliberal institutionalists
would predict cooperative behavior., 338  In the end, however, the
interests of sovereignty for states like the United States, Russia, China
and India outweighed the advantages of cooperation by joining the
331. SCHIFF, supra note 298, at 179 (emphasis added).
332. See generally id.
333. See id. at 89-90.
334. Id. at 90.
335. Id. at 192.
336. SCHIFF, supra note 298, at 254.
337. Id. at 90.
338. Id.
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ICC.339 Third, for constructivists, "the impulse to join [the ICC for most
states] must either be to support anti-impunity in other states or to
demonstrate adherence to the norms for some other reason, such as the
compulsions of identity or a quest for prestige.', 340  Whereas for states
opposing the ICC, their "dedication to absolute sovereignty is just as
much based on ideas as is dedication to alternative norms, as would be
decision makers' belief in their own exceptional right to carry out the
kinds of acts crirninalized by the [ICC] Statute."34'
Further, states generally prefer diplomatic solutions rather than
adjudications. They see the former as "posing fewer risks and offering
potentially more constructive resolutions than litigation would.,
342
Indeed, "states are particularly unwilling to enter into broad
commitments to adjudicate future disputes, the content and contours of
which cannot be foreseen. 3 43  Indeed, previous international criminal
tribunals were all established after the fact to respond to defined
situations where the failures of national systems were clear.344 In
contrast, the ICC was created to address future situations which could not
be defined in advance. 345 Therefore, there is a natural tendency for states
to fear possible politicized prosecutions and unforeseeable situations.
China arguably is even more inclined to prefer diplomatic solutions
over unpredictable international adjudications. First, traditional
Confucian thinking emphasizes harmony within the family and society,
and thus praises non-litigiousness. 346 Such culturally embedded thinking
is still very influential in modem China. Second, China tends to distrust
international judicial mechanisms because arguably they are mostly
occupied by western judges advancing western values and ideologies.
After all, international law itself is a product of Western civilization.
The fact that China has yet never resorted to the ICJ is the best example.
Third, for any rising state that possesses relatively weaker international
power of influence, it is arguably better for such state to avoid any kind
of political, legal or otherwise international restrictive mechanisms. In
fact the lesser and weaker these mechanisms are, the better for these
states. 347 Therefore, as a "system reformer" of the present international
339. Seeid. at 91.
340. Id. at 254.
341. SCHIFF, supra note 298, at 254.
342. Morris, supra note 307, at 15.
343. Id. at 15.
344. See id. at 37.
345. Kirsch, supra note 113, at 5.
346. THE ANALECTS 4 (Raymond Dawson trans., Oxford University Press, 1993).
347. See Hongsheng Sheng, The Role of the International Criminal Court in Realizing
International Justice and Maintaining World Peace, FORUM OF WORLD ECON. & POL. (in
Chinese), No. 3, 60, 63 (2003).
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legal system which China still distrusts, its attitude towards international
law would inevitably be one based on instrumental rationality, i.e., taking
a cost-benefit analysis approach, fully utilizing international legal rules
that are of use to it, evading those that are disadvantageous to it to the
extent possible.348
Moreover, the refusal of the United States to join the ICC,
especially its emphatic hostility towards to the ICC under the former
Bush administration, has attracted much criticism and been the focal
point of world attention. 349 This arguably worked as a shield and lifted
peer pressures for the other relatively less powerful states, including
China, who are reluctant to join the ICC. One could even argue that as
long as the United States is not on board, other non-party states,
including China, can safely follow suit.
In addition, states parties to the ICC do not seem to be in a position
to pressurize non-party states to join the ICC at this stage. Vis-A-vis the
United States, it could be explained that perhaps some states parties are
actually happy that the United States is "outside" of the game and thus
the ICC could be their court free from the influence of the United States.
While they encourage additional states to sign the Rome Statute, states
parties "do not accord accession a high priority in their bilateral relations
with non-signatories., 350 This means that China or any other non-party
states are presently not subjected to any real peer pressure to join the
ICC.
Lastly, one could question some of the aforementioned positive
reasons put forward to persuade China to join the ICC, in particular, the
marginalization argument. 351  "Universality remains an important goal
[for the ICC] because its legitimacy is strengthened by broad
acceptance. 352 The ICC also critically needs sustained cooperation and
support from as many states as possible in order to operate with efficacy
and vitality because enforcement power resides in states.353 In this
sense, politically, economically, and/or militarily influential states such
as the United States, Russia and China arguably can hardly be
marginalized vis-A-vis the operation and development of the ICC. The
348. Chongli Xu, "Outsider State of the System" Mindset and the Paucity of the
Chinese International Law Theory, TR1B. OF POL. SCI. & L., Vol. 24, No. 5, 33, 34
(2006).
349. See John B. Bellinger III, A Global Court Quandary for the President, GLOBAL
POL'Y F., Aug. 10, 2009, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/international-
justice/the-international-criminal-court/us-opposition-to-the-icc/48027 .html.
350. SCHIFF, supra note 298, at 254.
351. See supra Part IX.
352. Kirsch, supra note 113, at 5.
353. See Report of the ICC to the UN for 2007/08, UN Doc. A/63/323 (Aug. 22,
2008).
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UN Security Council's referral of the Darfur situation serves as the prime
example.354 Without the abstentions from the United States and China,
this referral could never have gone through. Indeed, many people see, or
would like to see these abstentions as significant signals of shift in
attitude towards the ICC by the United States and China. For the same
reason, one could also question the argument that non-party states would
not be able to participate in the discussions and decision making
processes within the ICC. Even if relatively powerful non-party states
can only participate in these processes as observers with no voting
power, their views and amendment proposals can hardly be ignored if the
ICC wants to encourage them to join. Still along the same line, one
could refute the view that the ICC would have any real impact on
relatively powerful non-party states because of the political infeasibility
for the ICC to go after these states in highly controversial situations
involving politically sensitive issues especially at its early existential
stage and at least for the foreseeable future.
In conclusion, there exist no real legal obstacles for China to join
the ICC. What is lacking is the political will of a rising power. China
still confronts thorny domestic issues that are susceptible to mass
violence. Thus, China is reluctant to voluntarily enter into yet another
multilateral restrictive regime where sovereignty related political
concerns still outweigh all legal arguments.
XI. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to show that the ICC's jurisdiction over
war crimes in internal armed conflicts does not pose real difficulty for
China if it wishes to join the ICC. First, the extension of the concept of
war crimes to internal armed conflicts reflects the normative trend
towards the gradual blurring of the conventional dichotomy between
international and internal armed conflicts for humanitarian purposes.
Admittedly, there is still room for China and other dissenting states to
contest the customary status of such trend. These states could argue that
many specially affected states (though debatable) such as Russia, China
and India oppose such extension and thus remain non-party states to the
ICC. And even if such extension has secured a customary status,
dissenting states could arguably still oppose it by resorting to the
principle of the "persistent objector" (though again controversial).355 But
because of the compelling rationale of this new trend, and that granting
the ICC with compulsory complementary jurisdiction over such crimes is
354. See supra Part VIII.B.
355. The principle of the "persistent objector" was developed by the ICJ in the
Fisheries Case (U.K. v Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 131 (Dec. 18).
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also with sound reasons, it would appear farfetched and no longer
plausible for China to rigidly insist on "respect for state sovereignty" and
"non-interference with internal affairs" to exclude minimum
humanitarian requirements and supervision by the international
community over the most heinous crimes committed in internal armed
conflicts.
Second, although some of the war crimes provisions under the
Rome Statute do go beyond that of customary international law, they do
not pose real difficulty for China's accession to the ICC vis-A-vis China's
real concerns over its domestic issues, i.e., the Taiwan issue, and to a
lesser degree, possible recurrences of separatist/terrorist violence in the
Tibet and Xinjiang provinces. Although the Taiwan issue is potentially
the most fatal conflict between China and the ICC, the Chinese
government is being overly cautious on the Taiwan issue vis-a-vis
possible reaches by the ICC for war crimes purposes. First, the outbreak
of a cross-strait armed conflict between mainland China and Taiwan is
highly unlikely. Even if a cross-strait armed conflict unfortunately
becomes a reality, there are many safeguards in the Rome Statute against
possible politicized prosecutions. Second, China's oppositions against
the extension of war crimes to internal armed conflicts under the Rome
Statute would become much less meaningful if the nature of a cross-strait
armed conflict becomes, or is nevertheless treated as an international one
when it actually occurs. Such internationalization of a real cross-strait
armed conflict is highly likely. In addition, disregarding the nature of a
hypothetical cross-strait armed conflict, current international political
reality indicates that it would most likely be politically infeasible for the
ICC to go after relatively powerful states in highly controversial
situations involving politically sensitive issues at least for the foreseeable
future.
To make the picture complete, this article also briefly analyzed
China's other four major official reasons for not joining the ICC, and
concluded that they too do not pose real difficulty for China if it wishes
to join the ICC. In addition, this article summarized many positive
reasons for China to join the ICC. The ultimate conclusion of this article
lies in that though understandable concerns do exist, no real legal
obstacles stand in the way for China's accession to the ICC. What really
explains China's current reluctance to join the ICC is the political
reluctance of a rising power, who still confronts thorny domestic issues
that are susceptible to mass violence, to be fettered by yet another
multilateral restrictive mechanism. In other words, sovereignty related
political concerns still heavily outweigh all legal arguments for China's
accession to the ICC at this stage.
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